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IS THERE AN OBLIGATION TO LISTEN?
Leslie GielowJacobs*
This Article thoroughly considers the question whether the constitutional guaran-
tee of "freedom of speech" includes an obligation to listen. It first reviews the
scopes of the right to speak, the right to listen, and the right to be left alone from
things other than unwanted speech, and the relevance to each of physical loca-
tion. It concludes that, consistent with constitutional doctrine and the Court's
articulations, the government's ability to protect individuals from unwanted
speech should not vary according to the listener's location. After noting that the
actual protection of unwilling listeners may differ because of the different physical
realities of the home as opposed to public places, this Article nevertheless proposes
an ideal scope of the obligation to listen, which, when met, should allow the gov-
ernment to protect individually targeted listeners from unwanted speech regardless
of their physical locations.
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment explicitly guarantees "freedom of
speech."' Implicit in this guarantee is the right to listen.2 The Su-
preme Court has also found that the right not to speak is part of
the Constitution's free speech guarantee." But what about a right
not to listen? Can the government enforce an individual's desire to
avoid unwanted communication?
The current answer to this question seems to be that the unwill-
ing listener's right to government protection depends upon the
listener's location. In the context of an abortion protest, the gov-
ernment may choose to protect unwilling listeners from speech
targeted into their homes,4 but it may not choose to protect unwilling
* Associate Professor, University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law. B.A. 1982,
Wesleyan University;J.D. 1985, University of Michigan Law School.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Go. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
(recognizing that "the First Amendment protects the public's interest in receiving informa-
tion").
3. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("The right to speak and the right
to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of
'individual freedom of mind.' "); see also Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796-97
(1988) ("[T]he First Amendment guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term necessarily com-
prising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.").
4. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) ("There simply is no right to
force speech into the home of an unwilling listener."); Rowan v. United States Post Office
Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970) ("In today's complex society we are inescapably captive
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listeners from similarly individually targeted communications when
listeners venture out of their homes onto "a public street or side-
walk."5 Specifically, there is no right "to be left alone, 6 from
"unwelcome speech"7 that can support an injunction's requirement
that a speaker "cease and desist" from individually directed com-
munication after the targeted listener has heard and rejected it.8
In many instances this geographical line corresponds to appro-
priate free speech principles: first, that the right of even a very few
potentially willing listeners should trump the desire of many unwill-
ing listeners to avoid the communication; 9 and second, that
unwilling listeners who can take private action to avoid unwanted
communications should do so rather than seek government inter-
vention. °
audiences for many purposes, but a sufficient measure of individual autonomy must survive
to permit every householder to exercise control over unwanted mail.")."
5. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 383 (1997) (quoting Pro-Choice Net-
work v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1435 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (upholding a "cease and
desist" provision of an abortion protest injunction, but doubting "that the District Court's
reason for including that provision-'to protect the right of the people approaching and
entering the facilities to be left alone'-accurately reflects [the] First Amendment jurispru-
dence in this area"); see also id, at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that "[tihe most important holding in today's opinion" is that "[t]here is no right to
be free of unwelcome speech on the public streets while seeking entrance to or exit from
abortion clinics.").
6. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 387 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Pro-Choice Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1435). Scalia further noted that the Court rejected
this purpose. See id. at 390 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7. Id. at 386 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8. Id. at 387 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Pro-Choice
Network, 799 F. Supp. at 1440). The injunction at issue stated in part as follows:
[N]o one is required to accept or listen to sidewalk counseling, and ... if anyone or
any group of persons who is sought to be counseled wants to not have counseling,
wants to leave, or walk away, they shall have the absolute right to do that, and in such
event all persons seeking to counsel that person or group of persons shall cease and
desist from such counseling, and shall thereafter be governed by the provisions of [the
injunction] pertaining to not demonstrating within fifteen feet of persons seeking ac-
cess to or leaving a facility.
Id.
9. See generally id. at 383 ("As a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate
our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide
adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment." (quoting
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994) quoting Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 322 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
10. Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971) (noting that unwilling lis-
teners can take private actions to avoid unwanted speech in a public courthouse), with Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (upholding a statute banning picketing a person's resi-
dence because that resident is "trapped within the home" and "left with no ready means of
avoiding the unwanted speech").
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But a geographical location line does not perfectly serve these
Free Speech Clause interests. On one side of the spectrum, the Su-
preme Court has recognized this imperfection, rejecting some
government efforts to protect listeners in their homes as too
broad." On the other side of the spectrum, however, the Court
seems to imply that a rigid rule rejecting any listener's right to be
left alone from unwanted speech in public appropriately imple-
ments Free Speech Clause values. That is, the Court interprets the
Constitution to impose an obligation to listen to unwanted expres-
sion on publicly situated individuals.
This Article examines whether the Constitution does, or should,
contain this implied obligation to listen. Part I sets out the current
scope of the right to speak, detailing how both the purposes of the
Free Speech Clause, and the doctrine developed to fulfill them,
focus on protecting communicative interchange rather than
speech alone. Part I also explains that the significance of the
speaker's physical location in Free Speech Clause doctrine stems
most fundamentally from assumptions about the balance between
relevant interests that relate to location. Part II sets out the scope
of the right to listen, similarly noting that the ostensible signifi-
cance of the listener's physical location becomes important only
when it correctly signals the balance between competing constitu-
tional interests of free speech and privacy.
Part III examines the scope of the right to be left alone. Contrary
to the Court's recent broad implication, the government can, in
many ways, protect such an individual right regardless of the indi-
vidual's physical location. Specifically, the government can protect
individuals from nonspeech harms that result from either non-
speech or speech activities, whether the individual is at home or on
a public street or sidewalk. The government has limited ability,
however, to protect an individual from harms that result from
speech. Moreover, the right to be left alone, like the right to speak
or the right to listen, depends on physical location. However, un-
like other free speech rights where geography is significant, the
Court does not implement a balance of Free Speech Clause inter-
ests in analyzing the government's ability to protect individuals
from speech harms.
Part IV posits whether there is, or should be, a right not to listen
to unwanted speech when on a public street or sidewalk. This Part
examines a number of possible explanations for the distinction
11. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943) (rejecting "stringent
prohibition" on all door-to-door soliciting when "leaving to each householder the full right to
decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors" would protect the unwilling listener).
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between listeners in their homes versus public places but concludes
that no explanation justifies the geographical distinction in a way
that relates to underlying Free Speech Clause values. This Part then
considers the more fundamental question of whether the First
Amendment should contain an obligation to listen regardless of
physical location.
In answering this question, Part IV sets out the ideal scope of the
obligation to listen according to the concept of preserving the pos-
sibility of communicative interchange that is the focus of the free
speech guarantee. The ideal scope of the obligation is a "one bite"
rule, which applies regardless of the listener's physical location.
This rule would allow a speaker an initial interchange with any lis-
tener, after which the listener could choose to reject further
communications. This Part then explains that, in light of the ideal,
the physical location of the listener only seems relevant because of
differences in the ability to isolate instances of the ideal that corre-
spond to the home and public places. Specifically, it is easier to
tailor a speech restriction to protect unwilling listeners in the home
as opposed to in public places. This fact means that such protec-
tions in public places are less likely to be valid. This practical
reality, however, should not skew the theoretical ideal. This Article
concludes that, when a restriction is obviously tailored to suppress
only individually targeted communications that listeners have
heard and rejected, unwilling listeners should be protected regard-
less of their physical location.
I. THE RIGHT TO SPEAK
A. The Interactive Focus of the Free Speech Right
The First Amendment, by its terms, protects "freedom of
speech."2 These words, and those of the Supreme Court interpret-
ing the free speech right, 3 may suggest that the speaker's interest is
the primary focus of the guarantee. But these words are deceptive.
Both the Free Speech Clause's purposes and the doctrine devel-
oped by the Court to fulfill them have a distinctive listener focus.
That is, these sources clarify that the First Amendment protects
speech, not primarily because of the liberty value to the speaker of
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech .... ).
13. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 (referring to "the freedom to speak foolishly and
without moderation" (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944))).
[VOL. 32:3
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uttering words, but because with speech comes the possibility of a
most profound constitutional value: communicative interaction.
1. Free Speech Clause Purposes-Numerous justifications have
been offered for the free speech guarantee; 14 probably none are
exclusive.'5 Instead, these justifications necessarily interrelate 16 and
share a fundamentally instrumental focus. That is, free speech is
valued not so much as a good in itself, but because of the good
things that result from it.' 7 And these good things depend not on
speech alone but also on communicative interaction.
One cluster of justifications centers around the collective indi-
vidual good achieved when citizens are exposed to a wide range of
differing points of view. From this general notion comes the more
specific commitment to a marketplace of ideas in which truth is
most likely to emerge. 18 Other related values within this general
cluster that freedom of speech may serve include promoting social
stability by providing a public outlet for numerous competing
14. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 119 (1989)
(surveying the many proffered justifications for the free speech guarantee).
15. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("We have ... no one Free Speech Clause
test.... [The different tests] simply reflect[] the necessary recognition that the interests
relevant to the Free Speech Clause inquiry-personal liberty, an informed citizenry, govern-
ment efficiency, public order, and so on-are present in different degrees in each context.");
Greenawalt, supra note 14, at 125-27 (arguing that the free speech guarantee is best ex-
plained by reference to a plurality of values).
16. For example, the justification that a regime of free speech promotes truth discovery,
see infra note 17 and accompanying text, also relates to the justifications that it aids the proper
functioning of democracy by creating an active and informed citizenry and that it promotes
individual autonomy, understanding, and rationality. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying
text.
17. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Frag-
mentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 89,
114 (1990) ("The core meaning of the constitutional right to speak is instrumental .... ");
Greenawalt, supra note 14, at 130 ("During most of the twentieth century, consequentialist
arguments have dominated the discussion of freedom of speech ... ."); Stanley Ingber, The
Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DuKE LJ. 1, 4 ("[Clourts that invoke the mar-
ketplace model of the [F]irst [A]mendment justify free expression because of the aggregate
benefits to society, and not because an individual speaker receives a particular benefit.").
18. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting a "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open"); Whimey v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring) ("[Those who won our independence] believed that freedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth .... "); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[T] he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market... ."); JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON
REPREsENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 13-48 (R.B. McCallum ed., Basil Blackwell & Mott Ltd. 1946)
(1859) (articulating the "search for truth" rationale for prohibiting government suppression
of speech).
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
points of view' 9 and promoting tolerance of differing points of
view. °
Other justifications for free speech focus on self-government.
Free speech, it is argued, promotes the system of liberal democracy,
both by exposing abuses of political power 2' and by enabling citi-
zens to choose most wisely and continue to evaluate the laws under
which they will live.2
In addition, the value of individual autonomy is often said to
underpin the free speech guarantee. Although this purpose, unlike
the previous clustered justifications, appears to have an exclusive
speaker focus, 23 it too hinges on communicative interaction. It is as
a listener that an individual is exposed to the many viewpoints from
which he chooses those that he will adopt as his own. And, even as
a speaker, the self-fulfillment of speech comes primarily from in-
terchange, not only from self-expression.24
2. Free Speech Clause Doctrine--From Free Speech Clause values,
the Supreme Court has developed a complex doctrinal framework
under which it evaluates individual claims to "freedom of speech."
Because it permeates Free Speech Clause values, this doctrine, too,
reflects the purpose of protecting communicative interchange.
Most fundamentally, whether an alleged act bears the potential of
communicative interaction determines whether it falls within the
19. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970)
(noting that the "process of open discussion promotes greater cohesion in a society because
people are more ready to accept decisions that go against them if they have a part in the
decision-making process" and thus that freedom of speech "provides a framework in which
the conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the soci-
ety"); Greenawalt, supra note 14, at 142 ("Though liberty of speech can often be divisive, it
can, by forestalling [the frustration caused when people believe they have been denied the
opportunity to present their interests in the political process], also contribute to a needed
degree of social stability.").
20. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREM-
IST SPEECH IN AMERICA 10 (1986) ("[The free speech principle] involves a special act of
carving out one area of social interaction for extraordinary self-restraint, the purpose of
which is to develop and demonstrate a social capacity to control feelings evoked by a host of
social encounters.").
21. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. Rs.J. 521, 527.
22. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 26 (1948).
23. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) ("To permit the contin-
ued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our
people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship.").
24. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 14, at 144-45 (describing the various ways that
communication has positive results for the speaker's emotional and mental development and
how curtailing free speech would frustrate these gains); David AJ. Richards, A Theory of Free
Speech, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1837, 1896 (1987) (discussing the role of discussion of facts and
values central to the priority of free speech).
[VOL. 32:3
Is There an Obligation to Listen?
realm of Free Speech Clause protection. The distinction between
expressive and nonexpressive conduct illustrates this priority.
Whether one categorizes conduct as expressive or nonexpressive
is highly significant to the speaker's free speech rights, because
only conduct deemed expressive receives Free Speech Clause
analysis.2 5 To be expressive, one must at least intend to communi-
cate a message through conduct, 26 but this alone is not sufficient.
2 7
In addition, an audience must be reasonably likely to understand
the message. 28 Thus, at this crucial juncture in Free Speech Clause
analysis, constitutional doctrine distinguishes between conduct that
fulfills the speaker's interests alone and that which is part of a po-
tential interchange. Only the latter is granted Free Speech Clause
protection. 29 Throughout Free Speech Clause analysis, the primacy
of government purpose in determining the level of scrutiny with
which the Court will review all types of speech regulation also re-
flects a concern with protecting communicative interchange.
If the First Amendment's focus was on the speaker's right to ex-
press herself without respect to a potential audience, government
purpose would not matter. Whatever the government's purpose,
the impact on the speaker would be the same.3 ' Restrictions of at-
tempts to communicate, whether of conduct or speech and
whether directed at speech or only incidental to a nonspeech ob-
jective, thwart the speaker's interest in exactly the same way.
Instead of the speaker, it is the audience that is dramatically af-
fected by government purpose. Content-directed government
actions are most suspect because they "raise[] the specter that the
25. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 703-05 (1986) (distinguishing cases
"involving governmental regulation of conduct that has an expressive element" from cases
involving activities that "manifest[] absolutely no element of protected expression").
26. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (requiring as the first prong
of its two-prong test for symbolic conduct "[a] n intent to convey a particularized message").
27. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("We cannot accept the view
that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.").
28. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 411 (requiring as the second element of its two-prong test for
symbolic conduct a likelihood "that the message would be understood by those who viewed
it.").
29. See id.
30. Compare R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based regula-
tions are presumptively invalid."), and Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)
("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."), with O'Brien,
391 U.S. at 377 (The Court applied its lenient balancing test to a government regulation that
incidentally restricted expressive conduct because "the governmental interest [was] unrelated
to the suppression of free expression.").
31. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34
STAN. L. REV. 113, 128 (1981) (noting that both content-based and content-neutral restric-
tions "reduce[] the sum total of information or opinion disseminated").
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Government [sic] may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints
from the marketplace,"0 2 thereby perverting reflections about truth
and self-government in its own favor.3 These concerns relate to in-
formation and idea flow, not the outgoing act only.34 This confirms
the doctrinal priority of protecting speech because it is potentially
part of a communicative interchange.
B. The Relevance of the Speaker's Physical Location
In a number of ways, Free Speech Clause doctrine explicitly ac-
knowledges the relevance of the speaker's location. Specifically, a
speaker has a broad right to speak on her own property. 5 She also
has a broad right to speak on publicly owned property that has tra-
ditionally or by government designation been held open for1 6
expression. She has less right to speak on public property not
dedicated to expression. 7 Finally, a speaker has no federal constitu-
tional right to speak on privately owned property other than her
38
own.
Although geography may appear to be a determining factor in
Free Speech Clause analysis, it is, in fact, a shorthand reference to
constitutional principles that do not depend upon physical loca-
tion. Specifically, physical location in Free Speech Clause doctrine
represents the probability that government action will restrict
communicative interaction, as well as a presumptive balance
32. RA.V, 505 U.S. at 382 (quoting Simon and Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y.
State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
33. See, e.g., R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 382 ("The First Amendment generally prevents govern-
ment from proscribing speech ... because of disapproval of the ideas expressed." (citations
omitted)).
34. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) ("We have recognized that the First
Amendment reflects a 'profound national commitment' to the principle that 'debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.'" (quoting New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (stating
that free speech is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena
of public discussion).
35. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54 (1994) (characterizing speech from the
home as "a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important").
36. See Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 46 (1983).
37. See id. at 46, 49.
38. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (rejecting the assumption, in the
context of a peaceful trespass protest at the county jail, "that people who want to propagan-
dize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and
wherever they please."). But see Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980)
(upholding an interpretation of the California Constitution that required private shopping
mall owners to allow others to reasonably exercise their free speech rights on the premises).
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between the speaker's constitutional right and the competing
rights of others.
With respect to the home, speech from it is highly protected, in
part because the possibility is great that a communicative inter-
change will result. 9 A speaker's interest in communicating from the
home is high because the combination of residence and speech
"carries a message quite distinct, 40 from any other, which means
that "[no] adequate substitutes exist for [this] important medium
of speech."41 Moreover, that the speaker owns the property from
which he speaks indicates that the exercise of his free speech right
at that location is less likely to conflict with the legitimate rights of
others than speech in other locations42 and thereby diminishes the
legitimate reasons that the government can have to regulate ex-
pression in order to serve the broad public interest.43 That speech
occurs from the speaker's home thus signals a heightened individ-
ual speech interest, which reverses the usual presumption that the
government may restrict individual behavior to pursue majoritarian
interests.
By contrast, speech that occurs on another's privately owned
property presents a lower probability of communicative inter-
change, at least when the speech is targeted at the property owner
and the owner objects to it. And, although a subset of such speech
on another's property that is symbolic public expression may have a
high possibility of communicative interchange," the means of ex-
pression presumptively conflict with the owner's legitimate
property right.45 Private property rights trump the free speech in-
terests of those who trespass for the purpose of communicating a
39. See, e.g., Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 54-55 ("Signs that react to a local happening or express a
view on a controversial issue both reflect and animate change in the life of a community....
[R] esidential signs have long been an important and distinct medium of expression.").
40. Id. at 56.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 58 ("Whereas the government's need to mediate among various competing
uses, including expressive ones, for public streets and facilities is constant and unavoid-
able, its need to regulate temperate speech from the home is surely much less pressing."
(citations omitted)).
43. Quite literally, it removes the "place"justification for content-neutral speech restric-
tions. See id. at 56 (noting that government may regulate the time, place, or manner of
expression if it "'leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communication'" but that
there are no adequate substitutes for signs displayed from the home (quoting Clark v. Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))).
44. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Applying Penalty Enhancements to Civil Disobedience: Clarifying
the Free Speech Clause Model to Bring the Social Value of Political Protest into the Balance, 59 OHIO-ST.
L.J. 185, 238-40 (1998) (arguing that publicly directed civil disobedience has Free Speech
Clause value).
45. See supra notes 42-43.
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message, and so the government may criminalize such conduct.4
That the speech occurs on the private property of another thus
signals a constitutional balancing that favors the legitimacy of the
government action.
On the other side of the physical location spectrum, speech that
occurs in a public forum is protected because it is presumptively
part of a communicative interchange.47 Even if there are no appar-
ent listeners, the possibility always exists that one will appear
because, after all, it is a public forum. Moreover, because speakers
cannot use the private property of others to convey their messages
without purchasing such a right, which will be beyond the means of
many,48 it is important to retain the public arena open to ensure
the fullest possible expressive interaction. Not only is the public
location a proxy for a high possibility of communicative inter-
change, it also signals a low likelihood that speech will interfere
with others' legitimate interests. No private property rights are im-
pacted and those whose privacy is disturbed can presumptively
preserve it by taking private action.49
All of the above presumptions, which seem to depend upon
physical location, are rebuttable by a showing of government inter-
est. That demonstrates that it is the free speech values, not
geography alone, that drives constitutional doctrine. In sum,
physical location is important to free speech doctrine because of
legitimate interests that it signals in most instances. But where
those interests do not apply, Free Speech Clause doctrine allows for
a result at odds with the presumption that arises from physical loca-
tion.
46. See Bruce Ledewitz, Perspectives on the Law of the American Sit-In, 16 WHIiTrIER L. REv.
499, 535-36 (1995) (noting that there is no "doubt about the amenability of [expressive] sit-
ins as such to State criminal prosecution").
47. See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (stating that
from "time out of mind, [streets and parks] have been used for purposes of assembly, com-
municating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.").
48. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) ("Door to door distri-
bution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.").
49. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) ("[T]he bur-
den normally falls upon the" offended listener "to 'avoid further bombardment of [his]
sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes.'" (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21
(1971))).
50. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (stating that a content-based
speech restriction in a public forum is valid if it is necessary to serve a compelling government
interest); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58-59 (1994) (suggesting that "more temperate
measures" that might restrict some speech from the home would comport with the Constitu-
tion).
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II. THE RIGHT TO LISTEN
A. Scope of the Right to Listen
The interactive focus of the free speech right" means that in-
cluded within the express guarantee of "freedom of speech" is the
implicit guarantee of a right to listen. Not only is the right to listen
constitutionally protected, it predominates over the other rights
encompassed within the free speech guarantee. The Constitution
protects the right to listen even when the speaker does not, alone,
possess a constitutionally recognized interest in self-expression.5
2
"By protecting those who wish to enter the marketplace of ideas
from government attack, the First Amendment protects the pub-
lic's interest in receiving information. 5 3 In the instances where they
conflict, the Free Speech Clause also protects the right to listen
over the right to speak.54 More significantly, because the conflicts
are more numerous, the Free Speech Clause protects the right to
listen over the right not to do so."s In this busy, crowded nation, the
interests of willing, or potentially willing, listeners and the interests
of unwilling listeners will often conflict.56 When conflicts occur, the
interests of the willing or potentially willing listeners will almost al-
ways prevail in the constitutional analysis, no matter how few in
number the willing listeners may be as compared to those who do
not want to receive the communication. 57
Paul Robert Cohen's expletive-emblazoned jacket worn in the Los
Angeles County Courthouse presents the quintessential example of
51. See supra Part I.A.
52. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
("The constitutional guarantee of free speech 'serves significant societal interests' wholly
apart from the speaker's interest in self-expression." (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 776 (1978))).
53. Id., 475 U.S. at 8.
54. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387-88 (1969) (stating
that the government may limit speakers to prevent "chaos" and to ensure the possibility of
meaningful communications"); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949) ("Hecklers may be
expelled from assemblies and religious worship may not be disturbed by those anxious to
preach a doctrine of atheism. The right to speak one's mind would often be an empty privi-
lege in a place and at a time beyond the protecting hand of... public order.").
55. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (stating that "adverse emotional im-
pact on the audience" does not justify punishing speech (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988))).
56. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-11 (1975).
57. See, e.g., id. at 210 ("[T]he Constitution does not permit government to decide
which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for
the unwilling listener or viewer.").
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constitutionally protected offensive expression." In response to the
government's argument that it could prohibit Cohen's speech to
protect "unwilling or unsuspecting viewers,"59 the Court responded
that "we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and
subject to objectionable speech."60 Unwilling viewers did not have
privacy interests that would justify the speech suppression, because,
rather than being "powerless to avoid [the offensive] conduct,"
61
they "could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensi-
bilities simply by averting their eyes."6 2 Requiring unwilling listeners
to experience the offensive communication, albeit briefly, is neces-
sary to protect "the arena of public discussion."6 The offensive
words had a "communicative function"' crucial to the Court. Al-
though distasteful to some, the words conveyed a message that
might move some listeners.
In other cases in which it has evaluated offensive speech regula-
tions, the Court has relied on these same considerations,
protecting the rights of potentially willing listeners to receive
speech when unwilling listeners have the ability to avoid it. The
Court invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting the door-to-door dis-
tribution of handbills, noting that it "submit[ted] the distributor to
criminal punishment for annoying the person on whom he calls,
even though the recipient of the literature is in fact glad to receive
it."65 The Court noted the following:
[T]he dangers of distribution can so easily be controlled by
traditional legal methods, leaving to each householder the full
right to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors,
that stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that for-
bidden by the Constitution, the naked restriction of the
66dissemination of ideas.
Similarly, the Court invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting out-
door movie theaters from showing nudity that might be visible to
58. Cohen was convicted of disturbing the peace for wearing ajacket bearing the words
"Fuck the Draft" in a corridor of the Los Angeles County Courthouse. See Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
59. Id. at 21.
60. Id. (quoting Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)).
61. Id. at 22.
62. Id. at 21.
63. Id. at 24.
64. Id. at 26.
65. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144 (1943).
66. Id. at 147.
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passersby.6' The Court found that the ban might deter the showing
of even "educational" films to willing viewers,6 while "the offended
viewer readily can avert his eyes." 9
The so-called hostile audience cases confirm the constitutional
judgment that listeners' reactions to speech are not generally a suf-
ficient justification for suppressing the communication. So, for
example, the Court overturned Jesse Cantwell's breach of the
peace conviction for peacefully playing a record critical of organ-
ized religion, and the Catholic Church in particular, to passersby
who, after initially granting permission, found its contents offen-
sive.70 The Court found his "effort to persuade a willing listener" to
adopt his point of view constitutionally protected, "however mis-
guided others may think him," absent evidence that his speech
would endanger a substantial government interest apart from the
citizens' sensibilities.71 Later cases have virtually eliminated hostile
audience reaction as justification for suppressing speech, placing
the burden on the government to supply adequate police protec-
72tion against onlooker violence.
1. Limits to the Right to Listen
a. "Incidental" Restrictions--As noted above,73 much turns on the
government's purpose in taking an action that suppresses speech.
If the government regulates conduct rather than speech, or if the
government regulates speech in a way that does not depend upon
an expression's subject matter or particular message, it may inci-
dentally protect listeners from speech they do not want to
encounter. So, for example, when the government prohibits draft
card burning with the alleged purpose of preserving the efficiency
of the draft,74 viewers who dislike the message of the symbolic act
are no longer required to witness it.7s But this is an incidental effect
of an ostensibly conduct-directed regulation. Where there is no
67. See Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217 (1975).
68. See id. at 211.
69. Id. at 212.
70. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 302-03, 311 (1940).
71. Id. at 310.
72. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111, 113 (1969) (overturning dis-
orderly conduct conviction of demonstrators who refused to disperse when onlookers
became unruly); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 550 (1965) (overturning a breach of the
peace conviction of demonstrators which was based upon "the reaction of the group of white
citizens looking on from across the street" absent a credible threat of violence that the police
would not be able to handle); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963) (stating
that the Constitution "does not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of
unpopular views.").
73. See supra Part I.
74. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968).
75. See id. at 377.
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plausible nonspeech purpose for regulating a symbolic act, such as
flag burning, the government cannot prohibit it and unwilling lis-
teners are obliged to turn away.76
Similarly, the government has a freer hand in protecting citizens
from disruptive noise levels77 and other generally undesirable non-
speech effects of expressive activities. 7s The government may even,
in some instances, justify an ostensibly content-based speech regu-
lation on the grounds that its rule addresses the nonspeech
secondary effects of the expressive activity. 7 But such content-
neutral secondary effects such as "crime, maintenance of property
values, and protection of residential neighborhoods, "so which
"happen[] to be associated with [the] type of speech [featured at
adult movie theaters],""' differ from "the emotive impact of speech
on its audience., 82 Thus, "[1]isteners' reactions to speech are not
the type of 'secondary effects"' that may insulate a regulation from
the strictest level of review. 83 Rather, the offended audience must
endure the communication, at least for the time necessary to leave
84
or otherwise insulate themselves from the unwanted expression.
76. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 (1990) (stating that the federal Flag
Protection Act of 1989 "suffers from the same fundamental flaw [as the Texas statute]: It
suppresses expression out of concern for its likely communicative impact"); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) ("The government generally has a freer hand in restricting expres-
sive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word. It may not, however,
proscribe particular conduct because it has expressive elements." (citations omitted)).
77. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784, 803 (1989) (regulating
musical performance volume); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 121 (1972)
(restricting noise outside school); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949) (restricting noisy
trucks).
78. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772 (1994) (holding in
part that health effects of protest activities mayjustify restrictions on expression).
79. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-51 (1986) (analyzing a
zoning ordinance that limits adult theaters to certain sections of the city as content-neutral
because it "aimed not at the content of the films shown at 'adult motion picture theaters,' but
rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community"); see also Young
v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71-73 (1976) (holding that a state may legiti-
mately use the content of adult materials as the basis for placing them in a different
classification than other motion pictures because it is justified by the city's interest in preserv-
ing the character of its neighborhoods).
80. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988).
81. Id. at 321.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 572 U.S. 753, 773 (1994) (noting in part
that an injunction cannot limit sign displays outside of an abortion clinic because medical
personnel or patients could simply shut the shades); Boos, 485 U.S. at 322 (finding foreign
diplomats' dignity interests no more compelling then those of American citizens in justifying
a ban on critical placards outside the embassies); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183
(1983) (invalidating a prohibition on carrying a sign or banner outside the Supreme Court).
The exception to this general rule that places the burden on listeners to avoid unwanted
communications is obscenity, and to a lesser extent, profanity. The government may entirely
[VOL. 32:3
Is There an Obligation to Listen ?
b. Captive Audience Protections--Although the free speech guar-
antee privileges the right to listen, the Court has nevertheless
recognized that the government may sometimes choose to restrict
the rights of some to listen in order to protect the right of others
not to do so. The Court has carefully defined the circumstances
under which such protection of unwilling listeners is appropriate.
According to the Court, "[t]he ability of government, consonant
with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others
from hearing it is ... dependent upon a showing that substantial
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner."85 In other articulations, the Court has said that the gov-
ernment's power to protect listeners from unwanted speech
depends upon whether the listeners are "captive," 8. meaning that
they cannot take private action to avoid the unwanted communica-
tion.
suppress communications that meet the definition of obscenity. See Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The trier of fact must use the following three-prong test to determine
whether a communication is an obscenity:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically de-
fined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. (citation omitted). The government may also restrict indecent expression more broadly
than other types of expression. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978)
(holding that the FCC may prohibit the broadcast of a vulgar monologue during afternoon
hours when children may be part of the audience). But see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849
(1997) (holding that Communications Decency Act provisions that prohibit knowing trans-
mission to minors of "indecent" or certain "patently offensive" communications abridge free
speech protected by the First Amendment). Although the Court has created other categories
of unprotected expression, obscenity is the only one where the Court has accepted the gov-
ernment's interest in protecting an unwilling audience from offense as the primary
justification for suppressing speech. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. V. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
47 U.S. 749, 751 (1985) (noting that defamation is unprotected in part because the commu-
nication is false); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (noting that incitement is
unprotected by the First Amendment because of the likelihood of imminent nonspeech-
related danger); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (upholding convic-
tion for using fighting words because they are likely to result in public disorder). Because it
privileges the interests of unwilling listeners over those who may want to receive the expres-
sion, this obscenity exception stands in tension to the general thrust of the free speech
guarantee, which is to protect the free exchange of ideas. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 919 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that suppressing obscenity be-
cause it presents thoughts and impressions that challenge the social order "cannot be
squared with a constitutional commitment to openness of mind").
85. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 21, 22 (1971).
86. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) ("The First Amendment permits the gov-
ernment to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when [a] 'captive' audience cannot avoid
the objectionable speech.").
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These two requirements-substantial invasion of privacy interests
and listener captivity-overlap in the instances in which the Court
has found a legitimate government interest in restricting speech to
protect unwilling listeners. In the course of invalidating a local or-
dinance banning door-to-door solicitation,7  the Court noted
several constitutionally permissible ways that a city could protect
individuals in their homes from unwanted speech.8 In contrast to
the broad ban, the valid alternatives left the decision whether to
listen to a proffered communication "where it belongs-with the
homeowner himself."89 Thus, "[a] city can punish those who call at
a home in defiance of the previously expressed will of the occupant
,,90
The Court has also upheld a federal statute that would require
that the Post Office comply with a homeowner's request not to re-
ceive certain types of mail.91 "In today's complex society we are
inescapably captive audiences for many purposes, but a sufficient
measure of individual autonomy must survive to permit every
householder to exercise control over unwanted mail."92 Although
the Court acknowledged that the prohibition might "operate[] to
impede the flow of even valid ideas," it responded that "no one has
a right to press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient."9 It
concluded that "[n] othing in the Constitution compels us to listen
to or view any unwanted communication."
94
In several other decisions, the Court has found government ef-
forts to protect unwilling listeners to be valid even though they did
not, like a "No Solicitors" sign or the statutory mail rejection, de-
pend upon previous expressions by the listeners that the
communications were unwanted. A plurality found a city's purpose
to protect captive commuters from unwanted communication in
part to justify a ban on streetcar placards.5 The Court noted that
[t] he streetcar audience ... is there as a matter of necessity, not
87. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943).
88. One example is "[g]eneral trespass after warning statutes." Id. at 147. Another is a
model ordinance "which would make it an offense for any person to ring the bell of a house-
holder who has appropriately indicated that he is unwilling to be disturbed." Id. at 148.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 729-30 (1970)
(discussing 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (1964), currently found at 39 U.S.C. § 3008 (1994)). This section
provides a procedure for a household member to insulate himself from "[any pandering]
advertisements which offer for sale matter which the addressee in his sole discretion believes
to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative." 39 U.S.C. § 3008(a).
92. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736.
93. Id. at 738.
94. Id. at 737.
95. SeeLehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974).
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of choice,' 96 and whereas "' [t]he radio can be turned off,"' this is
not true of "'the billboard or street car placard.' 97 The Court up-
held a local ban on targeted residential picketing in part to protect
"the unwilling listener."98 Although the Court characterized the
right that justified the government's protection as "a special benefit
of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls,"99 it also
noted an earlier case involving public handbilling, where the Court
"spoke of a right to distribute literature only 'to one willing to re-
ceive it." ' 100 Finally, in another case where the government more
clearly sought to limit speech into the home based upon noise
rather than its offensive content, the Court again noted both the
Free Speech Clause's general limit to the opportunity to "reach the
minds of willing listeners"10' and the more specific lack of a




B. The Relevance of the Listener's Physical Location
As Free Speech Clause doctrine relates the speaker's physical lo-
cation to the scope of the right to speak,'03 it also relates the
listener's physical location to the scope of the right to listen. A lis-
tener has the broadest right to listen on his own property.'0 4 He has
a very broad right to listen on publicly owned property that has tra-
ditionally or by government designation been held open for
expression. 0 5 The listener has a diminished right to listen on public
property not dedicated to expression.0 6 Finally, a listener's right is
96. Id. at 302 (quoting Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952)
(DouglasJ., dissenting)).
97. Id. (quoting Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932)).
98. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 485 (discussing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)).
101. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949).
102. Id. at 86.
103. See supra Part I.B.
104. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (holding that the government can-
not criminalize reading or viewing obscenity in the person's home).
105. This is the flip side of the speaker's broad right to communicate in a public forum.
See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
106. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
(noting that, in a place of employment, the government may restrict outsider's speech to
employees "to avoid interruptions to the performance of the duties of its employees").
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at its lowest ebb when the speech at issue is directed into private
107property that is not his own.
Although these rules may appear to depend upon geography,
like the right to speak rules, they stem from constitutional values
that do not depend upon physical location. Specifically, the geo-
graphical lines reflect the probability that government action will
restrict communicative interchange, as well as a presumptive bal-
ance between listener's constitutional rights and competing rights
of others.
0 8
In the home, the choice to listen evidences a high probability of
communicative interchange, and the private location creates a pre-
sumptive lack of captive unwilling listeners. On public property,
government restrictions of the right to listen have a strong prob-
ability of limiting communicative interchange because of the many
different types of listeners who may legitimately be there. In these
locations, unwilling listeners are presumptively free to leave and
avoid unwanted communications. That the government may more
easily restrict the right to listen on government property not dedi-
cated to expression reflects a recognition that there may be more
competing interests in those locations. One of these is the interest
of unwilling listeners who are not free to escape unwanted com-
munications. 1°9 Finally, that listeners' interests are lowest with
respect to speech directed onto another's private property reflects
presumptions about the possibility of communicative interaction
and the balance of competing interests.
One presumption is that the possibility of communicative inter-
action between the speaker and the non-targeted listener is low or
could be achieved through more direct communication. "'Another
presumption is that the possibility of communicative interaction
between the speaker and the targeted listener is low as well where
the listener does not want to listen to the communication. Moreo-
ver, the unwilling listener's location on her own private property
heightens her privacy interest and suggests that there are other
ways for willing listeners to receive the communication. In all of
107. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (upholding ban on targeted residen-
tial picketing "even if some ... picketers have a broader communicative purpose").
108. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1974) ("American con-
stitutional jurisprudence, in the light of the First Amendment, has been jealous to preserve
access to public places for purposes of free speech[; however,] the nature of the forum and
the conflicting interests involved have remained important in determining the degree of
protection afforded... to the speech in question.").
109. See id. at 304 (noting the "risk of imposing upon a captive audience" through card
advertising in rapid transit cars).
110. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483 (stating that a ban on picketing a residence "permits the
more general dissemination of a message").
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these ways, the seemingly geographical lines of listener protection
reflect presumptions about the balance of Free Speech Clause values.
III. THE RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE
Contrary to the Court's recently expressed doubts,"' its First
Amendment jurisprudence leaves plenty of room for the govern-
ment to protect individual citizens' rights to be left alone, wherever
they may be, including "on a public street or sidewalk.",12 Instead of
a focus on the place of the protection, a focus on the harms sought
to be eliminated and the type of activity restricted explains the
scope of permissible regulation.
A. The Right to Avoid Nonspeech Harms
Crucial to the Court's analysis of whether an individual has a le-
gitimate right to be left alone is the nature of the harm from which
the individual seeks to be protected. Nonspeech harms can be
caused by either nonspeech or speech activities. What sets them
apart from speech harms is that the harm results from something
other than the harm-causer's message. Where the harm is speech-
neutral in this way, the Court has recognized a broad individual
right to be left alone.
1. Nonspeech Harms Resulting from Nonspeech Activities-To a lim-
ited extent, the Constitution affirmatively protects individuals'
rights to be left alone from nonspeech harms that result from non-
speech activities. Specifically, the Court has interpreted the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause to protect indi-
viduals from various types of intrusions.'" Because this is an
111. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 383 (1997) ("We doubt that the
District Court's reason for including that [cease and desist] provision-'to protect the right
of the people approaching and entering the facilities to be left alone'-accurately reflects our
First Amendment jurisprudence in this area." (quoting Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue,
799 F. Supp. 1417, 1435 (W.D.N.Y. 1992))).
112. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 383.
113. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1992) (right to abor-
tion before fetal viability); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262 (1990)
(right to choose not to receive unwanted medical treatment); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
79 (1987) (right of prisoners to marry); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-03
(1977) (right of nonnuclear family members to live together); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (right of married persons to use birth control); Rochin v. California, 342
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affirmative constitutional protection, the guarantee only operates
against government action. Nevertheless, in articulating the fun-
damental right to be left alone from certain types of government
action, the Court has embraced a concept of individual self-
determination, 1 4 the protection of which can also justify govern-
ment action against intrusive private action.
Even without a constitutionally protected individual interest, the
government may choose to protect individual citizens from a broad
range of nonspeech-related harms that result from nonspeech ac-
tivities. Free Speech Clause doctrine does not restrict the
government's action where neither the perpetrator's nor the vic-
tim's communicative interests are impaired.91 ' Consequently, mere
rationality tests the validity of the government's decision to protect
the private victim.1
6
The government routinely asserts an interest in protecting an
individual from nonspeech harms as the reason for its actions that
restrict the liberties of others. Criminal and tort law protect indi-
viduals' rights to be left alone from others who may harm their
persons or property. Property law protects the individual's interest
in being left alone in his land use decisions.117 Contract law, facili-
tating as it does interpersonal transactions, is perhaps less precisely
viewed as protecting a right to be left alone. Nevertheless, its rules
vindicate an interest in personal self-determination, enforcing
freely made personal decisions."8
In sum, government actions protecting individual rights to be
left alone are not anomalies. They are, rather, routine results of the
democratic process. In countless ways, the government restricts
some individuals' liberties because the democratic majority has de-
termined that the other individuals affected by the exercise of
some individuals' liberties should have the right to be left alone.
U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (right against nonconsensual stomach pumping); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (right to direct children's education).
114. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (stating that, with respect to the right to choose abor-
tion, "[t]he destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of
her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.").
115. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993) (finding that the Free
Speech Clause does not prohibit the government from criminalizing, and enhancing the
penalty for committing, bias-motivated crimes).
116. See id. at 488 (purposes for enhancing the penalty for particular types of crimes
need only be "reasonable" (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 16 (1979)).
117. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1979) ("It is true
that one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is the right to exclude others."
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979))).
118. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON& LEE C. BOLLINGER, CONTRACT LAW IN MODERN SOCI-
ETY 298 (1980) ("A person becomes obligated under contract law because he or she agreed to
some obligation.").
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2. Nonspeech Harms Resulting from Speech Activities-When a harm
is caused by a speech activity, the First Amendment becomes a po-
tential limit on government efforts to protect the affected
individual since it is the harm-causer's "freedom of speech," rather
than the impacted individual's right to be left alone, that is explic-
itly guaranteed. Nevertheless, that the prohibited act may involve
speech does not, alone, immunize the act from government restric-
tion based upon its individual harm-causing potential. Speech,
such as incitement 19 or extortion, may constitute a crime. Simi-
larly, defamation may be the basis for tort liability121 and words, of
course, can constitute a prohibitable breach of contract. In each
instance, the direct connection between the content of the expres-
sion and nonexpressive harms justify the prohibition.
Verbal harassment constitutes the outermost border of speech
activity whose nonspeech harms may justify restrictions. Numerous
jurisdictions enforce telephone harassment statutes, often without
articulating a clear constitutional justification. 2 3 The Model Penal
Code defines telephone harassment as a call made "without purpose
of legitimate communication.",
2 4
This focus on the potential for interpersonal speech exchange
underlies the Supreme Court's recognition that the government
may protect citizens from face-to-face harassment, even though re-
strictions on speech may be its means.125 Although the Court has
not specifically defined harassment, the justification for prohibiting
harassing speech seems to be that the strident and persistent
means of delivery transform what might at first have been an effort
119. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (stating that the government
may criminalize "inciting... imminent lawless action.").
120. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994) ("Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or
affects commerce ... by robbery or extortion ... shall be fined under this title or impris-
oned.").
121. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761
(1983) (holding that tort remedy is appropriate for speech involving no matters of public
concern); NewYork Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-84 (1964) (permitting tort liabil-
ity upon a showing of actual malice).
122. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, & THE USES OF LANGUAGE 58 (1989)
(terming these types of utterances "situation-altering" and subject to government regulation
because they are "outside the scope of a principle of free speech.").
123. See Alan E. Brownstein, Hate Speech and Harassment: The Constitutionality of Campus
Codes that Prohibit Racial Insults, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 179, 194-200 (1994) (surveying
the judicial defenses of telephone harassment statutes).
124. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4(1) (1962).
125. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 385 (1997) (noting that the re-
striction on protesters' speech rights "is the result of their own previous harassment and
intimidation of patients"); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772 (1994)
(protecting psychological and physical well-being of captive protest targets are government
interests strong enough to justify restricting free speech rights).
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at a free speech exchange into a nonspeech harm that the state
may prohibit.2 6 Consistent with this understanding, the Court up-
held a ban on targeted residential picketing in part because those
whose protest "is narrowly directed at [a] household ... generally
do not seek to disseminate a message to the general public, but to
intrude upon the targeted resident, and to do so in an especially
offensive way.", 27 This means of expression diminishes the speech's
potential for communicative impact, which the First Amendment
protects, while heightening the probability that it is experienced by
its target, and perhaps other potential targets, as coercive. 12 Repeti-
tion of the speech, especially after the target has indicated a desire
not to hear it, is another factor that decreases the possibility that
the expression will be part of a communicative interchange and
thus may transform it from protected expression into unprotected
harassment.
2 9
Even when speech has the potential for communicative inter-
change, the Constitution permits some regulation of it in order to
protect others' rights to be left alone. Sometimes, the government
may proscribe speech because of the means of conveying it are par-
ticularly intrusive. The doctrine of time, place, and manner
restrictions recognizes that the government has greater freedom to
regulate speech without respect to its content for the purpose of
126. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 385 (referring to "harassment and intimidation"); Madsen,
512 U.S. at 760 (enjoining protesters from "physically abusing, grabbing, intimidating, harass-
ing, touching, pushing, shoving, crowding or assaulting" clinic patients).
127. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988).
128. See Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 396 (2d Cir. 1995), rev'd in part and
affd in part, 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (Winter, J., concurring) (stating that targeted residential
picketing "seeks to compel the homeowner to buy peace by abandoning convictions and to
warn those who might share the homeowner's convictions to alter their views or suffer the
same fate.").
129. See Schenck 519 U.S. at 384-85 (noting the district court's finding that "[m]any of
the [protesters] ha[d] been arrested on more than one occasion for harassment, yet persist
in harassing and intimidating patients, patient escorts and medical staff' (quoting Pro-Choice
Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1425 (W.D.N.Y. 1992))); Frisby, 487 U.S. at 498
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting that after protesters have communicated their message
to the home resident, there is "little justification for allowing them to remain in front of his
home and repeat it over and over again simply to harm the doctor and his family"); Brown-
stein, supra note 123, at 200-02. Brownstein notes three possible justifications for using
repetition as a basis for non-protection of the speech:
[T]he more a statement is repeated, the more doubtful we become that the speaker's
purpose involves communication of information or opinion[;] ... repeated phone
calls ... are of little value in objective terms [because w]hatever message the caller
hoped to communicate has already been received[;] ... repeated phone calls almost
always involve a listener who has indicated in unmistakable terms that they do not
want to continue to be spoken to by the person placing the call."
Id. at 200.
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protecting citizens' rights to be left alone from the hubbub of un-
restricted communications at certain times and in certain places." °
Time, place, and manner restrictions usually vindicate a general
public interest in being left alone from auditory13 1 or visual 132 clut-
ter.
Consequently, in these many ways, the Court has recognized that
even when speech is part of the harm-causing activity, there may be
a right to be left alone.
3. The Relevance of the Victim's Physical Location-In most of the
above-mentioned instances, the victim's physical location is irrele-
vant to the government's ability to protect her right to be left alone
from nonspeech harms. Criminal, tort, and contract law protec-
tions follow the right-holder wherever she may venture, from her
own home, onto the public streets, and even into the private home
of another. -Property law, by its very nature, has a geographic locus
to its protection. But the geography relates to the location of the
item protected. If something in a very public place threatens to in-
jure the property, the law can reach out and stop it.'"
Similarly, so long as the speech does not have communicative in-
terchange value, the ability of the government to protect
individuals from nonspeech harms caused by speech activities fol-
lows the individual from the home and into public places. Threats
are prohibitable wherever they might occur. Telephone harass-
ment need not be directed into the home to be outlawed. 3 4 Courts
may enjoin verbal harassment even when it occurs on a public
street or sidewalk. 1 The definition of defamation includes its pub-
lic nature.16 For all of these nonspeech harms that result from
nonspeech or speech activities that do not have communicative
interchange value, the location of the victim does not affect the
government's power to protect her.
130. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) ("[T]he need for reasonable pro-
tection in the homes or business houses from the distracting noises of vehicles equipped with
such sound amplifying devices justifies the ordinance [banning them].").
131. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989) ("The principal jus-
tification for the sound-amplification guideline is the city's desire to control noise levels at
bandshell events, in order to retain the character of the [area] and its more sedate activities,
and to avoid undue intrusion into residential areas and other areas of the park.").
132. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-08 (1981).
133. Cf Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 92-93 (1972) (finding that releasing
sewage in Lake Michigan can constitute a public nuisance).
134. See Brownstein, supra note 123, at 196-97.
135. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 385 (1997) (holding that the
government may restrict protesters' "harassment" of others on a public sidewalk).
136. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.2(1) (2d ed. 1993) ("Both libel and slan-
der require a 'publication' or communication by the defendant to someone other than the
plaintiff.").
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It is only when a speech activity potentially has communicative
interchange value with someone other than the protected victim
that the victim's location becomes relevant to the government's
ability to protect her, even from nonspeech harms. Sometimes the
government may nevertheless act to protect individuals from non-
speech harms, but the magnitude of the individual interests that
form the reason for the government's action must be weighed
against the free speech value of the communicative interchange
that might be restricted. The location of the victim is relevant in
this balance only because it signals the magnitude of both the like-
lihood of communicative interchange with others and the victim's
privacy interest. Where the victim is in her home, the Court has
found a greater government interest in protecting her from intru-
sion than when she is in some other location.'3 7 Specifically, speech
targeted at a home may have "a broader communicative pur-
pose, but its location, compared to other, more public ones,
makes it less likely that the publicly communicative purpose will be
realized and more likely that it will severely intrude on a victim who
has "no ready means of avoiding the unwanted speech." 39
In sum, the government has broad discretion to protect an indi-
vidual's right to be left alone from nonspeech harms even when
they result from speech occurring on a public street or sidewalk.
Even where Free Speech Clause restrictions apply, physical location
is only a signal for when a particular balance between competing
constitutional interests is likely to attach. In circumstances where
the presumption that arises from physical location does not hold
true, constitutional principles, rather than rigid geography, will
prevail.
B. The Right to Avoid Speech Harms
Speech harms are those that come from the content of an ex-
pression. That is, the communicative impact of the speech activity
inflicts a psychic wound, such as anger, shame, resentment, or of-
fense. Unlike regulation to prevent nonspeech harms, which may
often raise no free speech clause question, regulation to prevent
137. Compare Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (restricting targeted residential
picketing even though the activity may have "a broader communicative purpose"), with Mad-
sen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994) (stating that the clinic may protect
its patients from the harm caused by outdoor placards by "pull[ing] its curtains").
138. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486.
139. Id. at 487.
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speech harms always presents a constitutional issue, and, because it
is aimed at the content of expression, invokes a high degree of ju-
140dicial suspicion.
1. Scope of the Right to Avoid Speech Harms--As with nonspeech
harms, there are several ways that an individual can effectuate a
right to avoid speech harms. The first is through private action de-
signed to avoid it. The second is by obtaining government
protection from it.
a. Private Efforts to Avoid Unwanted Speech---An individual's abil-
ity, through private action, to avoid unwanted speech has been
prominent in the Court's decisions evaluating government actions
designed to protect individuals from unwanted speech.14' The indi-
vidual's right personally to avoid harm is at least of the same scope
with speech harms as with nonspeech harms. If it is possible to
avoid an encounter with harmful speech, an individual may do
so. 42 In fact, the Court expects the individual to do so, finding this
private ability to avoid speech to undercut government assertions
143that a speech restriction is necessary for public protection.
In addition, the individual interest in avoiding speech harms
may actually extend more broadly than the interest in avoiding
nonspeech harms, rising to the level of a constitutional right where
it is the government that seeks to inflict the speech harm. An anal-
ogy to the right to speak suggests that government efforts to
compel an individual to listen to unwanted speech might well run
afoul of the free speech guarantee.
Although not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the
Court has found the right not to speak flows from the free speech
guarantee. According to the Court, "[t]he right to speak and the
right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of
the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind.' ,4 Pursuant
140. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988) (noting "the 'First Amendment's
hostility to content-based regulation'" (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980))).
141. See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487 ("The First Amendment permits the government to
prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the 'captive' audience cannot avoid the objec-
tionable speech.").
142. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 821-22 (1974) ("[T]he constitutional right
of free speech has never been thought to embrace a right to require a journalist or any other
citizen to listen to a person's views .... ").
143. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974) ("[A]ppellant did not im-
pose his ideas upon a captive audience. Anyone who might have been offended could easily
have avoided the display.").
144. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)); see also Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487
U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988) ("[T]he First Amendment guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term
necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.").
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to this understanding, the Court has invalidated government ef-
forts to compel individuals to speak words chosen by the
government 145 or to grant access to 146 or fund 14 7 the expression of
other private speakers.
Similarly, a right against compelled listening might well flow
from the right to listen affirmatively embodied in the free speech
guarantee. In the context of compelled listening, the Court has
noted that "full capacity for individual choice.., is the presupposi-
tion of First Amendment guarantees."'4s government requirement
that individuals listen to unwanted speech would seem the same as
a compelled speech requirement because it "invades the sphere of
intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment
to our Constitution to reserve from all official control."1 49 However,
"[n] othing in the Constitution compels us to listen to or view any
unwanted communication. 150 Thus, the government probably may
not, without a compelling justification,15 ' either require individuals
to listen to government-chosen speech or to listen to more neu-
trally designated private speakers.
152
b. Government Efforts to Protect Individuals from Speech Harms-4n
contrast to the broad range of an individual's ability privately to
avoid speech harms, the scope of her right to seek government
145. See, e.g., Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 (state license plate motto); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642
(flag salute and pledge of allegiance).
146. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986)
(holding that utility is not required to grant space in its billing envelope to others' expres-
sion); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 244, 258 (1974) (holding that a
newspaper is not required to grant space to political candidates to reply to attacks upon
them).
147. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 16 (1990) (holding that mandatory state bar
dues cannot be used, in part, to fund lobbying); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,
235-36 (1977) (holding that union service charges used, in part, to fund lobbying cannot be
collected from employees who object to the politics or feel coerced into paying).
148. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 n.13 (1979) (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 650 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
149. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
150. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
151. Even the most dangerous speech restrictions can be justified if the government
shows that the "'regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that end.'" Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (quoting
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educs. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). In Burson, the Court
found that a state regulation establishing "campaign-free zones" around polling places met
this demanding standard. Burson, 504 U.S. at 211.
152. Cf Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J., con-
curring) (concluding that the "constitutional rights" of listeners preclude the government
from "transforming its vehicles of public transportation into forums for the dissemination of
ideas upon [a] captive audience."). The commuters at issue in Lehman were compelled to
listen out of practical, but not legal, necessity. Id. at 306-07. A hypothetical legal requirement
that all citizens attend a public issues symposium--or be jailed-would present the issue of
compelled listening more clearly.
[VOL. 32:3
Is There an Obligation to Listen?
protection constricts dramatically. That a harm comes from
"speech" implicates the Constitution's free speech guarantee di-
rectly. That is, any time that the government seeks to protect one
individual from a speech harm, it necessarily abridges the speech of
another. And it is "freedom of speech," rather than freedom from
unwanted speech, that the Constitution explicitly guarantees. 15
Thus, the Constitution might seem to have already dictated the
priority of the interests. Despite the wording, however, the Court
1 54has never interpreted the free speech guarantee to be absolute.
In certain circumstances, the Court has held that the Free Speech
Clause leaves room for the government to choose to protect some
private individuals from the unwanted speech of others.
Most bluntly, the Court has noted that "the right of every person
'to be let alone' must be placed in the scales with the right of oth-
ers to communicate."' 5 5 The instances where the listener's interest
prevails in the balance, however, are quite limited, consisting al-
most exclusively5 6 of instances where the communication enters
the home. 57
The Court's few holdings and implications establish the bounda-
ries of the government's ability to protect a homeowner's right to
be "let alone" from unwanted communication. The Court has held
that the government may enforce an individual homeowner's deci-
sion not to receive indecent communications through the mail
15
1
and has implied that the government may enforce a homeowner's
decision not to receive much broader types of information.59 The
Court has emphasized that government actions to implement indi-
vidual decisions not to receive communications may survive
constitutional scrutiny, while broad bans based upon presumptions
about homeowner preferences will be invalid. 65 Nevertheless, in
153. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech.").
154. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85 (1949) ("Of course, even the fundamental
rights of the Bill of Rights are not absolute.").
155. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736.
156. But see Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304. This exception is explicable on the ground that the
public buses subject to the speech restriction were government property that the Court found
not to be a communication forum.
157. See infra notes 158-167 and accompanying text.
158. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738.
159. See id. at 737 ("The Court has traditionally respected the right of a householder to
bar, by order or notice, solicitors, hawkers, and peddlers from his property."); Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943) (stating that a blanket ban on door-to-door solicitation
violates freedom of speech, but leaving the power to reject communications "with the home-
owner himself" comports with the Constitution).
160. Compare Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737 ("In this case the mailer's right to communicate is
circumscribed only by an affirmative act of the addressee giving notice that he wishes no
further mailings from that mailer."), with Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60,
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one instance the Court upheld a ban on targeted residential picket-
ing as "narrowly tailored to protect only unwilling recipients of the
communications,,16' despite the fact that the blanket ban did not
require the homeowner to indicate affirmatively that the expres-
sion was unwanted.
62
Outside the home, the government's ability to protect individu-
als from unwanted speech is much more limited. As with
communications into the home, the government cannot prohibit
certain types of communications in public places on the ground
that a majority of listeners would likely deem the communications
unwanted. 163 The Court has also held that, in a public place, the
government cannot protect individuals even from individually tar-
geted communications "[a]bsent evidence that the protestor's
speech is independently proscribable ... or is so infused with vio-
lence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm."64
Such a prohibition "burdens more speech than is necessary" to fur-
ther the government's legitimate interests. 65 The Court has not had
occasion to review a government effort to enforce an individual
decision to reject broad types of information in a public place.6 6 It
has, however, implied that, when the listener is located in a public
place, the government may not enforce an individual's right to be
left alone from a particular communication that the individual has
heard and rejected. 167 These rules, which seem to differ according
to the place of the communication, raise the relevance of physical
location to the right to be left alone from unwanted communica-
tion.
72 (1983) ("[W]e have never held that the Government itself can shut off the flow of mailings
to protect those recipients who might potentially by offended."). See generally Martin, 319 U.S.
at 147-48 (invalidating a blanket ban on door-to-door solicitation but noting that a regula-
tion enforcing a homeowner's indication that "he is unwilling to be disturbed" would be
valid).
161. Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).
162. See id. at 487 ("The offensive and disturbing nature of the form of the communica-
tion banned by the Brookfield ordinance ... can scarcely be questioned.").
163. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) ("[T]he fact that society may find
speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it." (quoting FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978))).
164. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994) (invalidating a no
approach zone outside an abortion clinic); see also Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 657 n.1 (1981) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("[Fairgoers] have
no general right to be free from being approached.").
165. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 774.
166. An example of this type of effort, in the abortion clinic context, would be an injunc-
tion that prohibited anyone from approaching any individual seeking clinic services who
wore a sign saying "Don't Approach Me."
167. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 377-80 (1997).
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C. The Relevance of the Listener's Physical Location
Constitutional doctrine seems to draw a line around the home,
protecting only those within it from unwanted communication.
'1
The rules concerning the home recognize that, at least sometimes,
individuals have an interest in screening and choosing the com-
munications that they will receive.9 The government may choose
to enforce this interest'" even though the individuals may screen
out information of high Free Speech Clause value.17 ' That is, at
least in some instances, the government may enforce an individ-
ual's choice to be left alone from speech harms.7 ' But the Court's
articulations concerning public location suggest that, in other in-
stances, the listener does not have such an interest. 173
These lines seem to depend upon physical location. But in all
other contexts, the ostensibly geographical lines in free speech ju-
risprudence have revealed more fundamental constitutional
judgments stemming from core Free Speech Clause purposes.174
The question is whether the same is true with respect to the line
around the home. Because this line depends on the listener's loca-
tion, protecting one in the home even from speakers located in
traditionally public places, 75 the more specific question is whether
168. See e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (noting that as to "protection of
the unwilling listener[,] ... the home is different"); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't,
397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) ("The ancient concept that 'a man's home is his castle' into which
'not even the king may enter' has lost none of its vitality, and none of the recognized excep-
tions includes any right to communicate offensively with another.").
169. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736 (referring to "individual autonomy" as the interest that
"permit[s] every householder to exercise control over unwanted mail").
170. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484-85 ("[A] special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy
within their own walls, which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid intru-
sions.").
171. In Rowan, the Court noted that if "the householder [is] the exclusive and final
judge of what will cross his threshold undoubtedly [this will have] the effect of impeding the
flow of ideas, information, and arguments that, ideally, he should receive and consider."
Rowan 397 U.S. at 736. However, the Court concluded that "the answer is that no one has a
right to press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient." Id. at 738.
172. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485 ("[W] e have repeatedly held that individuals are not re-
quired to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and that the government may
protect this freedom."); Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736 (upholding a homeowner's right to reject
mailings "he finds offensive").
173. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 386 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (describing the Court's "holding" to be that "It]here is no
right to be free of unwelcome speech on the public streets while seeking entrance to or exit
from abortion clinics.").
174. See supra Parts I.B, II.B.
175. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 480 ("[A] public street does not lose its status as a traditional
public forum simply because it runs through a residential neighborhood.").
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the listener's physical location relevantly relates to underlying Free
Speech Clause values.
1. The Listener's Physical Location as a Shorthand for the Possibility of
Communicative Interaction--One potential explanation for the seem-
ingly geographic line around the home is that it is an accurate
shorthand for the possibility of communicative interaction. Because
the listener located in the home is the only one within the forbid-
den circle of communication, a speech prohibition tailored to
expression targeted into that location does not preclude other lis-
teners from engaging in communicative interaction with the
restricted speaker. 176 When the government regulation simply en-
forces the preference of the listener not to receive the
communication, the probability that the regulation restricts a
communicative interaction is further reduced.
17
Nevertheless, the blunt judgment about the probability of com-
municative interaction is not perfect. In some instances,
communication ostensibly targeted at an individual homeowner
also sends a public message. 17 The Court's judgment that the gov-
ernment may still prohibit such expression privileges the
homeowner's privacy interests over the possibility of communica-
tive interaction in the particular way chosen by the speaker.79 Also,
government regulations that enforce a homeowner's decision not
to receive certain broad categories of communications leave open
the possibility that particular communications might, when specifi-
cally heard, turn out to be wanted. 10 Even if the communications
are unwanted, particular communications might still enter the lis-
tener's consciousness, influencing her opinions and perhaps her
actions. 8'Thus, the constitutional rule that allows the government
to enforce individuals' decisions not to receive these types of in-
176. See, e.g., id. at 483 ("General marching through residential neighborhoods, or even
walking a route in front of an entire block of houses, is not prohibited by this ordinance....
[O1nly focused picketing taking place solely in front of a particular residence is prohibited.").
177. See, e.g., Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737 (stating that the "right to communicate must stop at
the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee.").
178. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486 (noting that picketers targeting a particular residence
might "have a broader communicative purpose").
179. See id (stating that, despite the possibility that picketers might seek to send a public
message, their "activity nonetheless inherently and offensively intrudes on residential pri-
vacy").
180. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736 (noting that allowing a homeowner to exercise control
over unwanted mail will deprive him of information that he might otherwise "receive and
consider").
181. See id. at 736, 738 (allowing a homeowner to decline to receive certain types of mail
"undoubtedly has the effect of impeding the flow of ideas, information, and arguments" that
might be "valid").
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formation exists despite the fact that it potentially precludes some
communicative interaction.
By contrast, rules that the Court has struck down or questioned
in the public forum context seem better tailored to preserve the
possibility of communicative interaction than some of the home
rules that it has approved. Most particularly, the cease-and-desist
provision reviewed by the Court applied only to one-on-one com-
munications in which the listener had heard and specifically
rejected a speaker's message. 82 Moreover, the speakers, although
required to retreat from their targets, "remain [ed] free to espouse
their message" from a greater distance.' 3 In this situation there is
very little danger that the protective action eliminates potentially
willing, or otherwise fruitful, communicative interaction, as op-
posed to the broad bans that the Court has approved around the
home.
Even a no-approach provision, which the Court has invalidated
in the public context,8 4 seems better tailored to preserve the possi-
bility of communicative interaction than the blanket information
bans that the Court has indicated are permissible as to the home.
Where abortion protesters surround an abortion clinic, their gen-
eral anti-abortion message is not difficult to intuit. That they are
ready and desirous of providing more specific information can be
made quite clear by general signs and information-offering ges-
tures. Thus, all individuals entering the clinic are almost certain to
know the general gist of the proffered information and to know
that they can, at any moment, indicate a desire to receive it. Such
an interplay between speaker and listener is much more precise
than, for example, a "No Solicitors" sign l18 or a rejection of
"pandering" advertisements,8 6 which stop all speakers within the
definition without advising the homeowner of the specific content
of the message.
With respect to the right to speak and the right to listen, the
core goal of preserving the possibility of interchange between
182. SeeSchenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 371 (1997) ("[T]he 'cease and de-
sist' provision ... forces sidewalk counselors who are inside the buffer zones to retreat 15 feet
from the person being counseled once the person indicates a desire not to be counseled.").
183. Id. at 385.
184. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994) ("[It is difficult,
indeed, to justify a prohibition on a/! uninvited approaches of persons seeking the services of
the clinic .. ").
185. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943) (stating that it is up to the
homeowner to decide by sign, or other appropriate indications, "whether distributors of lit-
erature may lawfully call at a home").
186. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 729-30 (discussing 39 U.S.C. § 4009(a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV),
current version at 39 U.S.C. § 3008(a) (1994)).
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speakers and potentially willing listeners explains the ostensibly
geographic lines apparent in the doctrine. The juxtaposition of the
public forum and home cases relating to the right not to listen re-
veals that this fundamental free speech value does not adequately
explain the significance of the listener's physical location.
2. The Home as a Shorthand for the Constitutional Balance Between
the Right to Speak and a Listener's Autonomy Interest in Avoiding Un-
wanted Speech---"The Constitution extends special safeguards to the
privacy of the home.' 87 Specific constitutional text protects the
home. '88 Although the provision speaks most clearly of physical se-
curity, the Court has interpreted "the sanctity of the home"'8 9 to
more broadly limit government intrusion into that sphere. ' 90 Thus,
the Constitution implies an individual autonomy interest located in
the home.
In addition to implementing the communicative interchange
priority, the significance of the home in free speech doctrine re-
flects this individual autonomy interest. With respect to the right to
listen, the government may not criminalize possession in the home
even of materials that it could ban in public.'9' It is not the state's
business to "tell[] a man, sitting alone in his own house, what
books he may read or what films he may watch."82 Because the
speech consumption occurs within the home, some of the interests
thatjustify public restrictions are not present to the same degree.
Moreover, the government interests that still apply to home con-
sumption are not sufficient to outweigh the individual's strong
autonomy interest in listening to the broadest range of communi-
cations. 94 In the context of the right to listen, the location of the
home represents a shorthand for the balance between government
interests in restricting the flow of communication and the individ-
ual's right to choose what items of information will become a part
187. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973).
188. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their...
houses... shall not be violated .... ").
189. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980).
190. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969). (overturning a conviction
based upon private use of obscene material within the defendant's home).
191. See id. at 559.
192. Id. at 565.
193. See id. at 567-68 (noting that government interests in protecting minors and facili-
tating the laws against the distribution of obscenity do not apply with the same strength to
private use within the home).
194. See id. at 567 (rejecting as insufficient a governmental interest in protecting society
from anti-social acts induced by private use of obscene material).
[VOL. 32:3
Is There an Obligation to Listen?
of his thoughts and mind, 19 with the home emerging as a special
place of self-formation.
Similarly, the home has a special autonomy-related significance
with respect to the right to speak. When a person places a sign at
her home, she sends "a message quite distinct from placing the
same sign someplace else."196 That is, the location, and particularly
its immediate connection to the identity of the speaker, is a crucial
ingredient of the message. This "communicative importance" 197 of
the place of expression is part of the individual's autonomy interest
in "choos[ing] the content of his own message." 198 Thus, in the
right to speak context as well as that of the right to listen, the home
signifies a place of heightened individual autonomy interest vis-a-vis
government interests in restricting expression.
But transposing this geographical concept into evaluations of the
right not to listen does not result in the same accurate shorthand
for the relative magnitude of the individual's autonomy interest as
against the government's interest in restricting expression. This is
because, unlike the right to speak or the right to listen, which op-
poses the government action, an asserted right not to listen is in
harmony with the government and in fact requires government ac-
tion to make it effective.'gg Thus, with the right not to listen, the
government's interest is the individual's interest. The question
then becomes whether the geographical lines retain their signifi-
cance as shorthand references to the balance between the
competing interests when it is a private speaker, rather than the
government, who threatens to inflict the unwanted harm.
Viewing the balance as between the listener's autonomy interest
and that of a private speaker, rather than the government, alters
the significance of the home. The constitutional significance of the
home is that it is a refuge from intrusive government action,00 the
one discrete location specially immune from democratic, utilitarian
judgments that may legitimately prevail against individual interests
in all other locations. That a man's home is his castle is an important
195. See id. at 565-66. The Court felt that, when the government criminalizes the posses-
sion of obscenity by an individual in his own home, it unconstitutionally asserts "the power to
control men's minds.... [and] the moral content of a person's thoughts." Id. at 565.
196. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43,56 (1994).
197. Id.at57n.15.
198. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)
(noting that autonomy in choosing the content of one's own message is "the fundamental
rule of protection under the First Amendment").
199. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (noting that the state may legislate to
protect residential privacy).
200. See supra notes 187-95 and accompanying text.
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concept to hold up against otherwise completely pervasive majori-
tarian decisions.
But the legitimate priority of one private interest against another
in locations outside the home is not so firmly established. Rather,
the presumption is that the choice of which private interests to
privilege with protection from other private interests lies within the
domain of democratic decision-making.' As noted earlier, with
respect to government decisions to protect private individuals from
nonspeech harms inflicted by other private individuals, the Consti-S 202
tution does not attach special significance to the home. Where
the interests involved are simply one private will against another,
the government may choose between them without respect to
physical boundaries. The question is whether the fact that the in-
trusive private action is speech reintroduces the relevance of
physical location.
Answering this question requires distinguishing between private
speech interactions that the Court has determined to have Free
Speech Clause value and those it has placed beyond constitutional
protection. The home boundary retains its significance, even be-
tween private speaker and listener interests, where the speech has
Free Speech Clause value beyond the one-on-one interchange that
is the reason for the government regulation. Specifically, the physi-
cal location of the listener has constitutional significance in the
instances where the speech may reach beyond a single unwilling
listener. "Where a single speaker communicates to many listeners,
the First Amendment does not permit the government to prohibit
speech as intrusive unless the 'captive' audience cannot avoid ob-
jectionable speech."2 0  This type of circumstance, where a
government action may restrict a communicative interchange,
raises the presumption that the government's action is censorship
204
and therefore inimical to Free Speech Clause values. The home-
as-a-castle concept becomes relevant to dispel the presumption that
the government is acting as marketplace censor. 5 Only in the
home is the listener "captive" to the extent that the government
201. SeeSchneiderv. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) ("[Llegislative preferences or beliefs
respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other per-
sonal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to
the maintenance of democratic institutions.").
202. See supra Part III.A.3.
203. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541-42 (1980).
204. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971) (characterizing as "self-defeating"
the proposition that the state may "effectuate ... censorship" to avoid hostile reactions to
offensive speech).
205. See id. at 21 (government may protect unwilling listeners "upon a showing that sub-
stantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner").
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may legitimately assert private interests as the reason for restricting
speech that has the potential for communicative interchange.
20 6
Pursuant to the Court's current articulations of the relative
scopes of the right to speak and the right to listen, however, that
the harm-inflicting activity happens to be speech should not rein-
troduce the relevance of physical location so long as the
government, in regulating, is choosing solely between two private
interests. The right to speak and the right to listen both protect
207
speech with an interactive potential from government restriction.
As currently understood, these rights do not protect speech unless
there exists someone in the targeted audience potentially "'willing
to receive it."'20 1 Consequently, where a private speaker targets only
another private person unwilling to receive the communication,
the listener's physical location should not matter in determining
the scope of the government's power to protect her because, where
the restriction can be tailored to reach only this one-on-one con-
text, the Constitution does not specially protect the speaker. Thus,
a presumptive balance between the right to speak and the listener's
autonomy does not explain the significance of physical location in
evaluating government protections of unwilling listeners.
d. Conclusion-Both the home and the public forum carry spe-
cial significance in free speech doctrine. With the right to speak
and the right to listen, the home lends an added weight to an indi-
vidual's autonomy interest vis-a-vis hostile government action. With
respect to the right to be left alone from speech harms, the home
also has a special significance when a government action to further
that right conflicts with the right to speak. In the latter situation,
that the unwilling listener is at home lends weight to the govern-
ment's protection efforts. But, in the instances where the protective
government action only shields an unwilling listener without also
restricting speech that might reach willing recipients, the govern-
ment action does not conflict with a recognized free speech right.
Because there is no constitutional right to limit the government
action, the special significance of the home does not define the
scope of permissible government action. As with regulating
206. Compare Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) ("The resident is figuratively,
and perhaps literally, trapped within the home."), with Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
412 (1974) (stating that the protester burning a flag in a public place "did not impose his
ideas upon a captive audience [because alnyone who might have been offended could easily
have avoided the display.").
207. See supra Parts 1A, 1A
208. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485 (addressing public handbilling, the Court has spoken "of a
right to distribute literature only 'to one willing to receive it'" (quoting Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939))).
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nonspeech harms, the government should be as free to protect
unwilling listeners from individually targeted speech harms in pub-
lic as at home.
The Court's and Justices' recent articulations regarding the right
to be left alone from speech harms do not evidence this recogni-
tion. Rather, both imply that there is no right to be left alone from
unwanted speech in a public place, no matter whether the speech
is publicly or individually targeted. °9 These implications are incon-
sistent with what the Court has said about the right to speak,2 ° the
right to listen, and the right to be left alone.2  They raise the
question whether, contrary to the Court's articulations about these
rights, there is, or should be, an obligation to listen.
IV. Is THERE AN OBLIGATION TO LISTEN TO UNWANTED
SPEECH WHEN ON A PUBLIC STREET OR SIDEWALK?
The question whether there is an obligation to listen is, of
course, really a question about the scope of the right to free
speech. The Court's recent implication that, when an individual is
on "a public street or sidewalk" the government cannot choose to
protect her from individually targeted communications that she has
heard once and rejected,2  suggests that "freedom of speech" in-
cludes the right to press speech on an unwilling listener. The
implied scope of this right conflicts with the Court's many other
statements that willing communicative interchange forms the heart
of the Free Speech Clause's protection 214 and that individuals have
a cognizable autonomy interest in choosing not only to listen, but
209. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 384-85 (1997) (holding that the
district court erred in issuing an injunction to protect the right of listeners to be left alone);
see also id. at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("There is no right to
be free of unwelcome speech on the public streets... [outside] abortion clinics.").
210. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485.
211. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541-42 (1980).
212. See supra note 171.
213. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 383 (doubting that there is "any generalized right 'to be left
alone' on a public street or sidewalk").
214. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) ("[I]ndividuals are not required to
welcome unwanted speech into their own homes."); Rowan v. United States Post Office
Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) ("[N]o one has a right to press even 'good' ideas on an un-
willing recipient."); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949) (stating that a speaker has no
right to "insert a foot in the door and insist on a hearing"); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 148 (1943) (stating that the right to speak to homeowners does not extend to those
who indicate they are "unwilling"); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (stating that
the right to distribute literature in a public area extends "to one willing to receive it").
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also not to listen."' Although one way to reconcile these conflicting
implications is to align them with the geographical distinction be-
tween public places and the home,2 6 simply to state the distinction
is not to explain it. The question remains, why, when there are no
listeners other than the one who is unwilling, the home should be
special with respect to protecting the autonomy of the individual to
choose not to listen, while a public forum effectively imposes an
obligation to listen.
A. Possible Explanations for the Geographical Distinction
Numerous possible explanations underlie the right to listen's
geographical distinction. Although they individually or together
may support a presumption based upon the listener's physical loca-
tion, they do not support the current rigid geographical line.
1. Listeners Are "Captive" in Their Homes Whereas They Are Capable
of Avoiding Unwanted Speech When on a Public Street or Sidewalk-The
scope of the free speech right implied by the Court is perhaps best
illustrated by example. In invalidating Jesse Cantwell's breach of
the peace conviction for playing a phonograph record criticizing
the Roman Catholic Church to consenting passersby on the street
in an effort to proselytize them, the Court noted that he was en-
gaged "only [in] an effort to persuade a willing listener"217 and that,
upon being told that the speech was unwanted, "he would take the
victrola and [go away] .,,2"' The Court's recent statements about the
scope of the free speech right in a public forum imply that Cant-
well's regard for the receptivity of his audience was mere
politeness, irrelevant to the permissible scope of government re-
strictions. In fact, so long as he refrained from nonspeech conduct
that the government could prohibit, Cantwell had the constitu-
tional right to target individual listeners regardless of their consent,
to ignore their requests that he cease his communications, and to
continue to pursue them with his victrola until they reached prop-
erty from which he could lawfully be excluded.
These listeners do not fit the profile of the presumptively "free"
public forum listeners whom the Court has contrasted to the lis-
teners "captive" in their homes. In describing the "special benefit
215. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 ("[T]he home is different.").
217. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
218. Id. at 309.
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of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls," 21 9 the Court
has emphasized the physical captivity of the home resident,220 con-
trasting it with the "ease of avoiding unwanted speech in other
circumstances. 2 2 1 Yet cases noting the easy ability of offended lis-
teners to avoid unwanted communications have mostly involved
publicly targeted speech from which listeners could quickly "avert[]
their eyes''222 or "walk[] away''221 out of earshot. Where cases have
involved individually targeted communications, they have similarly
assumed that the listener had the ability, literally or figuratively, to
"say 'no"' to the speaker and thereby avoid further unwanted
224
communications. These cases did not involve efforts by a speaker
to follow and continue to foist communication upon a listener after
being told that the speech was unwanted.
A response to the pursued listener's dilemma, however, is that it
is possible to avoid the speech through private efforts. Nothing
stops individuals stepping out into a public thoroughfare from
wearing earplugs, covering their eyes or erecting psychological bar-
riers to entry, or at least being prepared to take these measures to
avoid repeated, unwanted expression. But, the free speech cost of
these ongoing protective measures is substantially greater than the
limited evasive actions thus far required by the Court.225
Earplugs, blinders, and psychological defense mechanisms
screen out not only the unwanted expression, but also any other
expression that may be competing for the listener's attention. A
pursued listener forced to take private evasive action risks losing
wanted communications along with that which he seeks to avoid.
Thus far, the Court's maxim that individuals must tolerate even
outrageous speech to fulfill the values of free expression has not
been applied to instances of repeated, individually targeted,
219. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484.
220. See id. at 487.
221. Id. (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971)).
222. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
223. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 657
n.1 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Because fairgoers are fully capable of saying 'no' to
persons seeking their attention and then walking away, they are not members of a captive
audience.").
224. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983), affd, 386
F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967)) (stating that the homeowner may take the "'short, though regular,
journey from mail box to trash can'" to avoid continued exposure to unwanted mail (quoting
Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1967))).'
225. See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487 (distinguishing instances where the listener has
"ready means of avoiding the unwanted speech").
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unwanted expression where the burden of private avoidance
threatens other free speech interests.
22 6
Of course, another response to the plight of the pursued public
listeners is that they will eventually reach their homes or some
other type of protected property. The existence of an ultimate ref-
uge thus distinguishes the burden of listening to repeated
unwanted speech in public as opposed to in the home. While this
distinction exists between an individually targeted listener in public
and in the home, there also exists the distinction between the un-
willing public listener who can easily avoid the speech and one who
is pursued. The fact that the former distinction exists does not ex-
plain why it is more constitutionally significant than the latter.
Rather, as the ease of avoiding speech has been the articulated ba-
sis for including within the free speech guarantee the right to
impose it even on listeners who are unwilling, whether the ease ex-
ists would seem to be more significant than physical location in
determining the scope of the free speech right in situations that
fall between the decided cases.
2. Constitutionally Permissible Conduct Restrictions Sufficiently Protect
the Unwilling Public Listener-As noted above, the Free Speech
Clause does not restrict the government's choice whether to pro-
tect individuals from nonspeech harms imposed by either the
nonspeech or speech conduct of other private individuals.227 So, the
government may choose to protect, unwilling listeners from non-
speech harms caused by speech or conduct. In the context of an
unwilling public listener pursued by a persistent speaker, these
harms would include harassment, 22 intimidation2 2 9 as well as the
harms inflicted by threats230 and stalking.231 Undergirding the impli-
cation that the government cannot choose to protect individuals
from speech harms on a public street or sidewalk is the assumption
that the government's power to punish the imposition of
226. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772-73 (1993) ("'The
First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical facility undertake Herculean
efforts to escape the cacophony of political protests.").
227. See supra Part IIA.1-2.
228. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 385 (1997) (justifying a speech re-
striction based upon "previous harassment... of patients").
229. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 774 (noting that the government may "burden[] speech ...
to prevent intimidation).
230. See id. (stating that threats are "independently proscribable").
231. Cf id. at 773-74 (implying that a court could protect an individual from being
"'stalked or shadowed'" if the conduct led to duress or intimidation).
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nonspeech harms sufficiently protects the legitimate interests of
the unwilling listener.
Taken at face value, this assumption as to the scope of protec-
tion that an unwilling listener may legitimately expect from the
government appears to be an acknowledgment that, in contrast to
a listener's protection in the home and in conflict with some of the
Court's more general articulations, a speaker's right in a public
place implies an obligation to listen.233 That is, the nonspeech
harms against which the Court has recognized that the government
may legitimately provide protection are exactly that-conduct
rather than expression.2 " Their definitions generally require more
than the annoyance, offense, or psychological distress that may
come from a gentle, but repeated, unwanted message and instead
require some sort of physical obstruction, 5 physical harm,236 or fear
thereof.23 7 If indeed the Constitution imposes this limit on the
scope of government protection, then it effectively also imposes,
through the free speech right, an obligation to listen.
The other possible explanation of the judicial assumption that
protection from nonspeech harms adequately addresses the inter-
ests of the unwilling listener is that a further unacknowledged
assumption underpins it. This assumption is that when speech
"goes too far" and the burden on the speaker, although not rising
to the level of obstruction, physical harm, or fear, nevertheless be-
comes in judicial judgment "severe," then the government may
protect the unwilling listener through one of the nonspeech harm
238prohibitions. Protections against "harassment" are particularly
232. See, e.g., id. at 774 (limiting protesters' speech as necessary to "prevent intimidation
[or] to ensure access to the clinic").
233. See supra notes 225-226 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 383 (1997) (doubting that a
"right ... to be left alone ... accurately reflects ... First Amendment jurisprudence" and
distinguishing Madsen, 512 U.S. at 753, as "sustain[ing] an injunction designed to secure
physical access to the clinic, but not on the basis of any generalized right 'to be left alone' on
a public street or sidewalk").
235. See, e.g., Madsen, 512 U.S. at 774 (stating that the government may only limit speech
activities as is necessary "to ensure access" to facilities).
236. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) ("[A] physical assault is not
by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.");
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) ("[V]iolence or other types of po-
tentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative
impact.., are entitled to no constitutional protection."); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) ("The First Amendment does not protect violence.").
237. See, e.g., Madsen, 512 U.S. at 774 (stating that the government may restrict speech
"so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm").
238. See, e.g., Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1995)
(Winter, J., concurring) (distinguishing speech to "the general public" or to a voluntary lis-
tener from instances "where specific individuals are targeted at locations difficult or
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susceptible to this use, and may, in practical effect, provide a scope
of protection similar to an explicit recognition of government
power to protect targeted unwilling listeners.23 9 The problem with
this assumption is that it leaves the scope of the unwilling public
listener's protection to judicial discretion, which is, in turn, con-
fined by a doctrine that defines the scope of the free speech right
so broadly that courts must resort to fine nuances in characteriza-
tion of speaker conduct to defend their decisions to protect
unwilling listeners.
40
In sum, absent subterfuge or creative wordplay, conduct restric-
tions do not protect unwilling listeners from speech harms. If they
are the sole types of protection that the government can accord to
unwilling listeners in public places, then the Free Speech Clause
effectively imposes an obligation to listen.
3. In the Context of Speech Outside Abortion Clinics, the Short Dura-
tion of Unwanted Speech Explains the Obligation to Listen-Another
possible explanation for the Court's skepticism that the govern-
ment may choose to protect a targeted listener's right to be left
alone on "a public street or sidewalk"2 4' is that the further geo-
graphical qualification-that the unwilling listener be seeking
"entrance to or exit from abortion clinics"14--is crucial to this con-
stitutional judgment. According such significance to this location
qualification would mean that perhaps the government may choose
to protect a targeted listener's right to avoid unwanted speech in
other circumstances even if the listener is in a public location.
In one sense, limiting the scope of the obligation to listen in this
way can indeed help justify it. The most obvious distinction be-
tween persistent speech outside an abortion facility and speech in
other public locations is spacial and temporal. Even pursuit in this
inconvenient for them to avoid, [where] the First Amendment's tolerance of plausibly coer-
cive or obstructionist protest is least" (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
239. See, e.g., id. at 396 (WinterJ., concurring) (finding "no right to invade the personal
space of individuals going about lawful business, to dog their footsteps or chase them down a
street, to scream or gesticulate in their faces, or to do anything else that cannot be fairly de-
scribed as an attempt at peaceful persuasion"); see also Schenck, 519 U.S. at 381 n.11
(upholding a "cease and desist" provision based on the conclusion that it was a legitimate
effort to "accommodate" the speakers' rights when "the District Court was entitled to con-
clude.., that the only feasible way to shield individuals.., from unprotected conduct...
would have been to keep the entire area clear of defendant protesters.").
240. See, e.g., Pro-Choice Network, 67 F.3d at 391-92 ("The purpose of [the 'cease and de-
sist'] provision is not.., to suppress speech because of the anxiety its content produces in its
audience, but rather to provide a vulnerable group of medical patients with some relief from
the duress caused by unwelcome physical proximity to an extremely vocal group of demon-
strators." (citation omitted)).
241. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 383.
242. Id. at 386 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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circumstance must take place within limited geographical bounda-
ries and thus a limited time frame. These limitations, in turn, can
be seen to translate into limitations on the speech harms that may
be imposed on the unwilling listener.4 3 These limitations may
therefore support a per se judgment that, when they apply, the
unwilling listener's burden will never outweigh the speaker's free
speech right and so there is no right to be left alone within these
boundaries.
But this type of line drawing is arbitrary in a number of respects.
First, like the other possible explanations, it does not explain why a
targeted unwilling listener receives different protection outside an
abortion clinic than inside the home. Second, while potentially lim-
iting the scope of an obligation to listen to unwanted speech, it falls
to explain what variables might change the speaker/listener bal-
ance in other situations. In particular, it fails to explain where or
when, after an initial rebuff by a listener, the government may re-
strict a speaker's continuing efforts of persuasion. Is two city blocks
too long a pursuit? Or, does ten minutes of peaceful but persistent
targeted speech become too long? Or two hours? Or two days? By
failing to provide guidance as to these issues, the Court ensures
that a limitation of the obligation to listen in the area outside abor-
tion clinics will become arbitrary in application as different
government actors reach different conclusions about the permissi-
ble scope of protection of unwilling listeners in other physical
locations.
For all of these reasons, a limitation of the implied obligation to
listen in the abortion protest context, while perhaps attractive in
the short run, only compounds the doctrinal confusion because it
fails to relate the relevancy of physical location to underlying Free
Speech Clause values.
4. Allowing No Right to Be Left Alone in a Public Forum Is Necessary
to Ensure That Publicly Directed Speech Is Fully Protected-According to
243. But see, e.g., Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1427
(W.D.N.Y. 1992), affd sub nom. Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 1994),
vacated in part on reh'g en banc, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995), rev'd in part and affd in part, 519
U.S. 357 (1997). The court noted the following:
[T]he risks associated with an abortion increase if the patient suffers from additional
stress and anxiety [caused by abortion protest activities]. Increased stress and anxiety
can cause patients to: (1) have elevated blood pressure; (2) hyperventilate; (3) require
sedation; or (4) require special counseling and attention before they are able to ob-
tain health care. Patients may become so agitated that they are unable to lie still in the
operating room thereby increasing the risks associated with surgery.
Id. at 1427.
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the Court, recognizing a right to be left alone from unwanted
speech in a public place would conflict with the general principle
that "'in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and
even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing
space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.' 2 44 This
principle stems from circumstances where the government sought
to limit publicly directed speech on the ground that some listeners
did not like its message.245 The Court's recent implication is that the
same need for "breathing space" exists when the government at-
tempts to restrict individually targeted expression on the ground
that its sole target does not want to receive it. But contrary to the
Court's assumption, the need for "breathing space" differs funda-
mentally depending upon whether the regulated speech was
publicly or solely individually directed.
The need for "breathing space" to protect free speech derives
from the imprecision of any government action that might be
crafted to limit the speech harms caused by protected expression.
2 46
In most instances, "[w]here a single speaker communicates to
many listeners"24 7 limiting speech for the benefit of some listeners
restricts the speech available to others. In such instances, the need
for "breathing space" dictates that only exceedingly strong privacy
interests of unwilling listeners can justify restricting speech to those
potentially willing to receive it. By contrast, when a single speaker
communicates with a single listener, restricting the speech when
that listener is unwilling does not limit the flow of speech to other
listeners. The speaker can continue to communicate with all other
listeners without restriction.249 Such a tailored limitation would not
seem to touch the "breathing space" that must circulate around
protected expression.
244. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 383 (quoting Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S.
753, 774 (1994) quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
245. See, e.g., Boos, 485 U.S. at 315 (discussing a statute that prohibited display of signs
near an embassy that "tends to bring that foreign government into 'public odium' or 'public
disrepute' "); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwel, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (protecting a cartoon
that was offensive to the portrayed individual but directed at the general magazine reader-
ship).
246. See, e.g., Boos, 485 U.S. at 322 ("A 'dignity' standard, like the 'outrageousness' stan-
dard that we rejected in Hustler, is so inherently subjective that it would be inconsistent with
'our longstanding refusal to [punish speech] because the speech in question may have an
adverse emotional impact on the audience.'" (quoting Hustler, 485 U.S. at 561)).
247. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 547 (1980).
248. See id. at 542 ("[G]overnment [may] prohibit speech as intrusive [only when] the
,captive' audience cannot avoid objectionable speech.").
249. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 385 ("[C]ounselors remain free to espouse their message
outside the 15-foot buffer zone [after being asked to 'cease and desist' by an individual tar-
get].").
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A reason for the flat rule that there can be no right to be left
alone in a public place might be that there is no way to craft such a
tailored speech limitation. That is, where speech occurs in a public
place, it is impossible to segregate solely individually directed from
potentially publicly directed expression. Sometimes this might be
true, when speakers use the means of identifying particular indi-
viduals through words or images to send a more public message. In
such instances, the "breathing space" rationale might dictate that
the speech not be limited to protect the unwilling listener.2 50 Other
times, however, it is possible to segregate solely individually di-
rected expression. The circumstance of "sidewalk counselors"
2
speaking to clinic entrants and a "cease and desist" limitation of it
would seem to present quintessential examples, respectively, of
solely individually directed expression and a government action
precisely tailored to limit only speech harms and no valuable ex-
pression directed at other, potentially willing, recipients. So a flat
rule against recognizing a right to be left alone from speech harms
in public places cannot be justified by the necessary imprecision of
any government regulation.
252In addition, as noted earlier, a "cease and desist" provision is
much better crafted to observe the Free Speech Clause's prime
concern with preserving the possibility of communicative interac-
tion than are the speech restrictions that the Court has approved
around the home. Consequently, a purpose of preserving
"breathing space" for the exercise of First Amendment freedoms
does not explain the distinction between the listener's location in
the home as opposed to public places with respect to the scope of
the free speech right and the governmentally protectable right to
be left alone.
5. Conclusion-None of these possible explanations adequately
address the Court's recent implication that, at least in public
places, the Free Speech Clause extends so far as to guarantee
speakers the right to continue to press communications on listen-
ers who have clearly indicated that they do not want to receive it.
That the Court has nevertheless implied that this right exists sug-
gests that something other than the usual goal of preserving the
250. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994) (rejecting
the ban on "images observable" from clinic windows).
251. Sidewalk counselors seek to engage in a one-on-one communication with people
entering or exiting abortion clinics. See Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue, 799 F. Supp.
1417, 1423-24 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359
(2d Cir. 1994), vacated in part on reh 'g en banc, 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995), rev'd in part and aff'd
inpart, 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
252. See supra Part II.B.2.
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possibility of willing communicative interchange underpins the free
speech guarantee. Specifically, it raises the question whether, when
a listener is in a public place, the Free Speech Clause should effec-
tively impose an obligation to listen.
B. Defining the Scope of the Obligation to Listen
As illustrated by the failure of the above explanations, examining
the scope of the obligation to listen from within the Court's deci-
sions, which assume the relevance of physical location, does not
explain it. It is more illuminating first to detach the physical loca-
tion issue and to determine the appropriate scope of the obligation
to listen by measuring it against the Free Speech Clause's guiding
principle of enhancing the possibility of communicative interac-
tion. After determining an ideal scope of the obligation to listen, it
is then possible to apply it in different physical locations to deter-
mine whether, because of the attributes of the home as opposed .to
public places, its scope should differ.
1. The Ideal Scope of the Obligation to Listen Determined According to
the Concept of Communicative Interchange-The concept of communi-
cative interchange that underpins the free speech guarantee
involves an exchange of ideas between a willing speaker 253 and a
willing listener.254 In a number of different circumstances, the
Court has indicated that the "willingness" component of the con-
cept has constitutional significance. In the context of speaking, the
right to refrain from doing so when one is unwilling is part of "'the
sphere of intellect and spirit"' protected by the free speech guaran-
tee. 55 In the context of listening, too, the ability to avoid unwanted
communications is an aspect of "individual autonomy."256 In both
respects, individual autonomy connotes control over the formation
of the self and its actions in the world. 57
253. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) ("The First Amendment pro-
tects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse
to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands [bearing the state's motto on a license
plate], an idea they find morally objectionable.").
254. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 821-22 (1974) ("[T~he constitutional fight
of free speech has never been thought to embrace a right to require ajournalist or any other
citizen to listen to a person's views .... ").
255. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (quoting Barnette v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
256. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970).
257. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REv. 875, 887
(1994).
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In practical application, these related concepts of individual
autonomy and willingness have led to a permissible range of gov-
ernment actions to protect individuals in their homes. Specifically,
the Court has accepted the government purpose to protect the in-
dividual autonomy interest in "willing" communicative interactions
as a constitutional value that can justify what might otherwise ap-
258pear to be an unconstitutional speech restriction.
As noted earlier, the scope of the autonomy protection around
the home is broad. The Court has upheld, in its efforts to protect
the "willingness" of the acts of listening, government actions that
enforce individual decisions to reject further communications from
particular speakers after receipt and review of a first communica-
tion;259 that enforce individual decisions not to receive broad types
260
of communications without any initial contact with the message,
and that prohibit certain types of communications from entering
the home without an individual rejection based on the assumption
that they are so likely to be unwanted.2 'As demonstrated above,
262
explanations that relate to preserving the possibility of communica-
tive interchange, as it has thus far been articulated by the Court, do
not justify the line that the Court has seemed to draw between
permissible government efforts to protect listener autonomy in
public places and in the home. The failure of these explanations
suggests that if willing interchange is indeed the Free Speech
Clause's focus, then the scope of protection for the individually
targeted listener should apply equally in public as well as in the
home.
Potential applications of this conclusion, however, draw it into
question. Specifically, in addition to validating government actions
such as "cease and desist" provisions, the translation of home rules
into public places would validate government actions to enforce, for
258. SeeF.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("[1]n the privacy of the
home.., the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights
of an intruder." (citing Rowan, 397 U.S. at 734; id. at 890.
259. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 734 (upholding a statute that gave the mail addressee
"complete and unfettered discretion in electing whether or not he desired to receive further
material from a particular sender").
260. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943) ("A city can punish those
who call at a home in defiance of the previously expressed will of the occupant.... .").
261. SeeFrisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988) ("Because the [targeted] picketing...
is speech directed primarily at those who are presumptively unwilling to receive it, the State
has a substantial and justifiable interest in banning it.").
262. See supra Part IV.A.
263. This would be the analog to a government action enforcing an individual's decision
not to receive further mail from a particular sender. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 734.
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example, individually-worn "Don't Approach Me" signs or even
more specific demands not to criticize the sign wearer.2 65 These ap-
plications, although protecting only individually targeted listeners
from speech that they are unwilling to receive and preserving the
speakers' abilities to engage in publicly directed expression, seem
intuitively inimical to a robust free speech regime. This invitation
raises the question whether "willing communicative interchange"
defines the appropriate scope of Free Speech Clause protection or
whether, in fact, the communicative interchange central to the
First Amendment includes some obligation to listen.
At the same time that the Court has seemed to focus on protect-
ing the possibility of willing communicative interchange, it has also
noted a speaker's right to reach a listener through insults orS 266
shame, embarrassment,267 and perhaps most importantly, persua-
sion.2 68 The latter, at least, implies a conversational effort of some
duration. It also would seem to imply some opportunity to reach,
and potentially change, initially closed minds. Although this type of
communication could occur through publicly directed expression,
one-on-one, particularly face-to-face efforts, might be persuasion's
most effective means.269 If this type of persuasion is a constitutional
value, then government actions to protect unwilling listeners even
from individually targeted communications will adversely affect free
speech at the same time that it protects individual autonomy inter-
ests.
Constitutional values and an understanding of the situated self07
dictate that the free speech right should include some ability to
264. This would be the public place analog to the "No Solicitors" sign approved in Mar-
tin, 319 U.S. at 148.
265. This would be the public place analog to the targeted picketing ban in Frisby, 487
U.S. at 488.
266. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (White, J., concurring)
("The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not
render the expression unprotected."); Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 395 (2d
Cir. 1995), rev'd in part and affJd in par4 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (Winter, J., concurring)
("[S]hame is a form of persuasion... [that] must be tolerated.").
267. See, e.g., NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982) ("Speech
does not lose its protected character... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce
them into action.").
268. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 712
(1992) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The First Amendment inevitably requires people to put up
with annoyance and uninvited persuasion."); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 459 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring) ("The First Amendment protects the opportunity to persuade to
action whether that action be unwise or immoral, or whether the speech incites to action.").
269. See, e.g., Note, Too Close for Comfort: Protesting Outside Medical Facilities, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 1856, 1861-62 (1988) (stating that proximity alone has some expressive value).
270. See, e.g., 1 CHARLES TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE: PHILOSOPHICAL PA-
PERS 8 (1985) ("The community is ... constitutive of the individual, in the sense that the self-
interpretations which define him are drawn from the interchange which the community
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interact individually even with unwilling listeners. The marketplace
of ideas metaphor contemplates an exchange and the emergence
of "truth," or at least common understandings, after consideration
and reflection. An understanding of the situated self includes a
recognition that cultural information and attitudes critically detract
from the natural autonomy of the self.27' Facilitating autonomy, un-
derstood as the fullest possible self-awareness and self-direction
despite these preexisting forces,2 might include protecting an in-
dividual's exposure to information different from that which would
form an individual's initial predilections. That is, recognizing the
limits of natural autonomy lessens the weight of the government's
interest in protecting absolutely an individual's decision not to re-
ceive speech.
Acknowledging the free speech value of persuasion even
through communicating with unwilling listeners does not, however,
defeat the individual autonomy interest. The value of choice as to
which communications to receive and incorporate into the self still
apply to individuals who are also, in part, constituted by forces be-
yond their autonomous control.27' Defining the scope of the free
speech clause's obligation to listen requires balancing these com-
peting notions of individual control and the free speech value of
preserving receptivity to unfamiliar communications.
The Court's decisions suggest a range of possible balances be-
tween the competing interests. First, the government could restrict
speech based upon the presumption that its listeners would not
want to receive it. 274 Second, the government could enforce indi-
carries on."); ErestJ. Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 472, 503
(1987) (noting numerous critiques of the Kantian conception of the self "for denying our
experience as socially and historically situated beings constituted in some crucial sense by the
communities in which we live and by the forms of life in which we participate").
271. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 119 (1986) (noting "the
unchosen sources of our most autonomous efforts").
272. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 257, at 888 ("[T] he self is a creature in and of the world,
but one capable of at least partially transforming herself through thought, criticism, and self-
interpretation.").
273. See, e.g., DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 71-72 (1986)
("Freedom or autonomy identifies the capacity of persons to formulate and act on higher-
order plans of action, which take as their self-critical object one's life and the way it is lived
274. This is analogous to a ban on targeted residential picketing as in Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988) ("[T]he picketing prohibited... is speech directed primarily at
those who are presumptively unwilling to receive it."), or on offensive words in public places
as in Cohen v. Calfornia, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) ("[T]he mere presumed presence of unwitting
listeners or viewers does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of
giving offense."), and like the "no approach" provision invalidated by the Court in the con-
text of abortion clinic protest in Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773-74
(1994) (holding that a ban on physically approaching any person seeking services of the
clinic in an area within 300 feet of the clinic must be invalidated absent evidence that the
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vidual decisions not to listen to particular types of communications
without the individual's first having heard them. These communi-
cations could be identified specifically, such as "Don't Talk to Me
About the Upcoming Elections" or even "Don't Approach Me with
Your Anti-Union Propaganda." These communications could also
be identified more generally, such as "Don't Approach Me.,1
75
Third, the government could enforce an individual decision not to
listen to communications from particular speakers after first having
heard them.7 6 Finally, the government could have no power to en-
force an individual's decision not to listen.277
Government action in the first category, limiting speech without
an individual rejection, would seem almost always to limit the pos-
sibility of communicative interaction without sufficient autonomy
justification .27  This is especially true since incorporating the
mechanism of individual rejection into the government action
would be an easily available alternative means to protect the individ-
ual autonomy interest in almost every instance.279 Absent a strong
interest in operating by means of presumption in a particular
280instance, the value of protecting the possibility of communicative
interchange dictates that the government secure an individualized
rejection before silencing the speaker to protect an unwilling lis-
tener.
Government action in the second category seems similarly too
heavily weighted toward protecting individual autonomy at the ex-
pense of the possibility of communicative interchange. Although
protesters' speech is independently proscribable or is infused with violence such that it is
indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm).
275. This is like a "No Solicitors" sign at a home. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 149 (1943).
276. This is like a "cease and desist" provision, see Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519
U.S. 357, 383 (1997), or a statute allowing homeowners to require particular speakers not to
send any further mail into the home, see Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S.
728, 730 (1970).
277. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 383 (doubting that there is a "right 'to be left alone' on a
public street or sidewalk").
278. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25-26 (noting the "emotive" function of words that some
find offensive).
279. Compare Schenck, 519 U.S. at 383 ("cease and desist" provision), with Madsen v.
Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773-75 ("no approach" provision). An individualized rejection
requirement would also have been an appropriate addition to the targeted residential picket-
ing. ban upheld by the Court. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988) (noting that
"hypothetical applications of the ordinance" such as "to picketers present at a particular
home by invitation of the resident [might] present somewhat different questions" although
failing to reach the issues in "disposling] of appellee's facial challenge").
280. Previous unprotected and illegal conduct by a particular individual subject to an in-
junction might provide for such a reason. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773 (noting that the state
court crafted the "no approach" provision to protect clinic patients from being "'stalked' or
'shadowed'").
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implemented according to an individual listener's rejection, this
type of action suppresses speech according to its category before
the listener has been exposed to the message of the particular
speaker. It thereby limits a vast number of potential communicative
interchanges based on a broad categorization. In other areas, the
Constitution is hostile to broad classifications when individual in-
stances within the group might not fit the stereotype. 28' This bias
against broad generalizations should apply to speech restrictions as
well. Different speakers bring different nuances to conversations
within the broad classes. These nuances might well strike responses
even in listeners who did not expect them. Government actions
that might potentially shield listeners from all of these possibilities
based on a single judgment cuts too deeply into the value of poten-
tial communicative interchange that underlies the free speech
guarantee.
Government actions in the third category represent the best bal-
ance between the competing interests. While actions in the first two
categories unduly limit the possibility of communicative inter-
change, establishing a rule allowing no government power to
protect an unwilling listener would favor the possibility of commu-
nicative interchange far beyond when it is likely to happen while
failing to dignify at any point an individual's autonomy interest in
rejecting unwanted communication. In contrast to an absolute
prohibition on listener protective government action, requiring
that the government act only after a listener has evaluated a par-
ticular message and rejected it gives each new speaker an
opportunity to engage in a communicative interchange with each
new listener while also enforcing the listener's particularized judg-
ment to reject it.
Although it might be argued that a rejection might be quick and
reflexive, and therefore some time period must be allowed for the
speaker to enhance the possibility of persuasion, any such rule lim-
iting the time period for rejection would be arbitrary and would
insufficiently weight the listener's judgment. A speaker who must
cease an individually targeted interchange still remains free to en-
281. For example, the Equal Protection Clause demands that government classifications
be tailored to ensure that limiting the actions of those within the group serves the purpose of
the regulation. Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995)
(holding that racial classifications must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling govern-
ment purpose), and United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 523 (1996) (holding that gender
classifications must be supported by an "exceedingly persuasive justification"), with William-
son v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (acknowledging that economic classifications
must be rationally related to a legitimate government objective).
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gage in publicly directed speech of the same content.282 Allowing
the speaker "one bite of the apple" with respect to the means of
one-on-one communication appropriately balances the free speech
values of communicative interchange and each listener's autonomy
to choose from the vast range of communications offered in the
marketplace, those that will form a part of the individual's con-
sciousness.18 The "one bite" rule is thus the constitutional ideal
with respect to listener-protective government actions.
2. The Relevance of Physical Location-Although a "one bite" rule
with respect to individually targeted communication may be the
ideal constitutional balance, neither the current rule with respect
to the home nor that with respect to public places corresponds to
it. Instead, as detailed earlier, these current rules constitute the
extremes at either side of the ideal balance.8 4 Taken together, the
two rules might be viewed as in effect achieving a similar balance,
with the home as a place of great escape from public places where
there is no escape whatsoever from unwanted communication. The
question is whether this balance through extremes that depends on
physical location best implements underlying constitutional values.
This Part will examine each location in turn to determine whether
the constitutional ideal should differ according to geographical
considerations.
a. The Home-As detailed earlier,2 5 the Court has established a
special status for the home with respect to the government's ability
to protect unwilling listeners from speech harms. The Court's ar-
ticulations as to the right of a listener to avoid unwanted
communications in the home has been broad, implying no limit to
the government's ability to protect homedwellers' decisions to re-
ject communications directed at them only. But does the free
speech goal of protecting the possibility of communicative inter-
change support such a broad scope of government protection of
listeners in the home?
The Court has approved government enforcement of individu-
ally placed "No Solicitors" signs, noting that such action leaves the
282. See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483 (stating that a targeted picketing ban "permits the
more general dissemination of a message").
283. See Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to Be Spoken to?, 67 Nw.
U. L. REv. 153, 193 (1972) (advocating a "one shot" principle).
284. Compare Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943) (approving a "No So-
licitors" ban without individualized rejection), with Schenck, 519 U.S. at 383 (implying that the
government cannot protect an individual's right to be left alone from unwanted communica-
tion on a public street or sidewalk even after an individualized rejection).
285. See supra Part III.B.2.
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decision to reject speech with the homeowner where it belongs.286
Government enforcement of a homeowner's decision to reject
communications endorsing Democratic political candidates or ad-
vocating gun control, however, seems less compatible with free
speech values. Although both types of government action simply
enforce individual homeowners' decisions to reject unwanted
communications targeted at them only, the latter uses government
power to suppress speech because of its content,2 7 which repre-
sents the quintessential Free Speech Clause danger.2ss Yet if a
homeowner has a special right to avoid speech harms, then this
means of discriminating among them should not matter.
Examination of the scope of the special status of the home, and
the ideal scope of the protection of the possibility of communica-
tive interchange reveals why this content discrimination, even in
the home, poses a constitutional danger. The home has a special
status in constitutional doctrine as an individual's one refuge from
otherwise completely pervasive majoritarian action.2s9 As noted
above, this justification for its unique treatment does not extend
to government efforts to protect unwilling listeners in the home
from private speakers. These efforts put the weight of majoritarian
action on the side of the home-dweller restricting the free flow of
communication. Thus, the reasons that support special treatment
of the home in other contexts do not support the distinction with
respect to government action protecting unwilling listeners from
speech harms.
Because a government action protecting an unwilling listener in
the home is a majoritarian action restricting the possibility of
communicative interchange beyond the ideal balance of speech
flow and autonomy interests, its speech justification should bear
the same weight regardless of the listener's physical location. Al-
though this conclusion would seem to dictate the same treatment
of unwilling listeners regardless of physical location as a matter of
theory, other protections unique to the home dictate a broader
range of permissible government protection in practice.
286. SeeMartin, 319 U.S. at 149.
287. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (defining a speech restriction as content-
based if its justification focuses on "the direct impact that speech has on its listeners").
288. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based regulations
are presumptively invalid.").
289. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) ("Our prior decisions have often re-
marked on the unique nature of the home ... and have recognized that '[p]reserving the
sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from the
tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important value." (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 471 (1980))).
290. See supra Part III.B.2.
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In particular, property concepts give home-dwellers a greater
right to exclude intruders than individuals possess in public
places. 91 A "No Solicitors" sign is ambiguous as to whether the
homeowner is seeking protection from speech harms or nonspeech
292intrusions. However, because of the home location, the presump-
tion of protection from nonspeech intrusions allows enforcement
of the exclusion. 93
By contrast, a sign excluding Democrats from offering commu-
nications is clearly directed at speech only.2 94 The ideal protection
of communicative interaction requires even a homeowner to reject
particular speakers rather than broad classes of communications.295
A government action enforcing this content-based exclusion, even
in the home, would therefore not comport with the free speech
guarantee.
In sum, the apparent different treatment of the home with re-
spect to speech harms is actually only different treatment with
respect to nonspeech impacts. Where the protection a homeowner
seeks is ambiguous, property concepts lead to the presumption that
the homeowner can exclude unwanted intruders. But where all the
homeowner plausibly seeks to exclude are speech harms, Free
Speech Clause values dictate that the "one bite" rule should apply
regardless of the unwilling listener's physical location. The gov-
ernment can enforce an individual decision not to listen to
communications only after the listener has heard and rejected
communications from a particular speaker.
b. Public Places-As noted above, the ideal balance between lis-
tener autonomy and the value of communicative interchange
would protect a speaker's initial contact with a potential listener
but allow the government, should it choose, to enforce the lis-
tener's decision to reject it. Although theory dictates that this
291. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (stating that
circumscribing homeowner's ability to reject unwanted mail "would tend to license a form of
trespass").
292. Compare id. at 737 (noting the Court's traditional respect for "the right of a house-
holder to bar, by order or notice, solicitors, hawkers, and peddlers from his property" as a
ground for circumscribing a "mailer's right to communicate"), with Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943) (suggesting the city may "make it an offense for any per-
son to ring the bell of a householder who has appropriately indicated that he is unwilling to
be disturbed").
293. See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487-88 (stating that targeted residential picketing disturbs
the quiet enjoyment of the home, creating discomfort from "'knowing that a stranger lurks
outside [the] home'" (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 478-79 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting))).
294. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (stating that the regulation is
content-based because it "describes impermissible picketing not in terms of time, place, and
manner, but in terms of subject matter").
295. See supra Part IVA.
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balance obtain regardless of the listener's physical location, the
overlap in practice of nonspeech autonomy interests with speech-
related autonomy interests means that unwilling listeners may re-
ceive greater protection in the home. Recognition of this practical
effect could lead to restricting the permissible scope of government
protection of the unwilling listener in the public sphere to com-
pensate for the greater protection at home. Again, however, it is
not necessary to distort the theoretical ideal to recognize that over-
lapping speech interests in the public sphere may effectively lead to
speaker protections beyond the ideal balance in the same way that
the opposite effect occurs in the home.
Free Speech Clause doctrine appropriately protects communica-
tions deemed unwanted by some, or even most, listeners when they
are plausibly also directed at listeners who have not rejected them.
Circumstances make it more difficult to isolate solely individually
directed communications in public places than in the home. The
communicative interchange value dictates that the presumption,
when the direction of speech is ambiguous, should be that it is pub-
licly as well as individually directed. Given this presumption, an
individual rejection will not be enough to support government ac-
tion to protect the unwilling listener. Only when it is clear that a
listener has received and rejected a targeted communication, will
the ideal balance apply.
Despite the fact that it may be more difficult to isolate instances
of solely individually directed communications in the public
sphere, it is not impossible to do so. Sidewalk counselors commu-
nicating with individual clinic patients in fact present an example
of a segregable instance of solely individually directed communica-
tion. That the presumption in the face of ambiguity is that the
speech is both publicly and individually directed should not cause
the Court to ignore the appropriate ideal balance when the ambi-
guity does not obtain.
c. Conclusion-That the home is a refuge from the cacophony of
the public sphere will protect most listeners in their homes from
unwanted communications targeted solely at them. Similarly, the
principle that public places must remain open for even outrageous
communications will protect most speakers in most public places
from government efforts to suppress their speech to serve the
autonomy interests of unwilling listeners. Both of these rules, how-
ever, represent presumptive balances of constitutional interests and
practical circumstances. These underlying values, rather than rigid
geographical distinctions, must form the most fundamental guide
to determining the validity of any particular government action. So,
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for example, when a homedweller seeks to exclude speech solely
because of its message, the ideal "one bite" requirement should
limit the government's ability to protect the unwilling listener re-
gardless of her location in a home. So, too, where the interests
presented in a public place exactly duplicate the interests in the
home that the Court has balanced in favor of allowing the govern-
ment to protect an unwilling speaker, then the constitutional
balance, rather than the rigid rule of physical location, should de-
termine the validity of the government action.
CONCLUSION
With respect to protection of an unwilling listener from speech
harms, the home should not be special. Rather, a balance between
the free speech value of preserving the possibility of communicative
interchange and the listener's autonomy interest in rejecting re-
peated unwanted communications should determine the validity of
a government action to protect an unwilling listener. In practical
effect, such government actions will be more likely valid with re-
spect to listeners in the home than with respect to publicly located
listeners. This difference, however, does not relate to the doctrinal
ideal, which is that a speaker get "one bite" of an individually tar-
geted prospective listener, after which the government may enforce
the listener's decision to reject further communications. Rather,
the apparently different treatment of speakers and listeners accord-
ing to their physical locations relates to the practical difficulties of
isolating situations that fit the constitutional ideal. In the home,
other legitimate interests weigh in favor of the listener, and so in
ambiguous situations, listener interests may prevail. Similarly, in
public places, speaker interests with respect to listeners other than
the one seeking protection weigh in favor of the speaker, render-
ing government efforts to protect one listener invalid when others
are present. In both instances, however, the sameconstitutional ideal
should remain the ultimate guidepost--preserving a possibility of
communicative interaction that includes regard for an individual's
self-conscious decision to reject unwanted communications.
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